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Race Politics, O’Hare Airport Expansion,
and Promissory Estoppel: The More Things
Change, the More They Stay the Same
JUDITH L. MAUTE*
Quake Construction v. American Airlines, Inc. is featured in some prominent American
casebooks on contract formation or precontractual liability, where scholars and
authorities debate when liability should properly attach. The case is widely cited by courts
and secondary authorities, both on precontractual liability based on a letter of intent and
the more unwieldy doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Quake is a 1990 Illinois Supreme Court decision which, on its face, appears to present the
garden variety contracts issue of what to do when parties have reached a written
preliminary agreement anticipating a formal writing that never occurs. Besides the
fascinating doctrinal issues presented, the backstory reveals sensitive racial issues in
Chicago’s political context at the time.
The dispute arose shortly after Mayor Washington was elected the City’s first black mayor
and he sought to open up public projects to minority groups that had been previously
excluded from the public trough. Much pressure was exerted upon American Airlines and
Jones Brothers, its construction management company, which awarded the small,
$1 million project to Quake as part of the larger O’Hare Airport expansion. This Minority
Business Set Aside (“MBE”) award was done without the due diligence prudent for major
jobs. Eight days later, when Quake’s president appeared at a preconstruction meeting as
the only person of color, without any of the named MBE’s listed on its bid, American’s
representatives summarily terminated the relationship.
Nearly nine years of litigation focused only on whether the trial court correctly granted
defense motions to dismiss. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding
the letter sufficiently ambiguous that plaintiff should have an opportunity to present parol
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evidence on the parties’ intent on the contract claim. In four short paragraphs the majority
opinion recognized the possibility of plaintiff recovering under a standalone claim for
promissory estoppel, based on claimed reliance occurring during the short time between
the notice of award and termination for this small construction contract.
The lack of clarity in drafting and implementation of the letter of intent should give pause
to commercial actors about the risks of sloppiness in the bargaining process, especially
when dealing with parties who may be perceived as somewhat unsophisticated. This
Article’s doctrinal treatment and backstory are a cautionary tale to lawyers embarking
on commercial relations using letters of intent.
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INTRODUCTION
The State of Illinois and city of Chicago have well-earned reputations
for sleazy politics, especially common in many public construction
projects.1 The political backstory to the 1990 Illinois Supreme Court
decision, Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., makes
sense of what appears to be an unusual case of precontractual liability.2
American Airlines (“American”), acting through its general
contractor, designated a small component of its work for the O’Hare
Airport Expansion to be performed on a fast track basis to a qualified
minority or women-owned business. The mid-March 1985 Invitation for
Bids for the work set a deadline of early April with work to begin by April
15 and to be completed by mid-August. Oral notice was given to Lawrence
Quamina, President of Quake Construction (“Quake”), followed by a
letter of intent dated April 18, 1985, stating “[w]e have elected to award
the contract for the subject project to your firm”; providing that a detailed
agreement was “being prepared”; including a brief description of the
scope of work for a stated price; and concluding that Jones “reserves the
right to cancel this letter of intent if the parties cannot agree on a fully
executed subcontract agreement.”3 The preconstruction meeting was
held on April 25, but ended abruptly with Jones terminating the
relationship, which was confirmed by letter later that day without
explanation as to the reason for such action. Quake responded, by filing
suit in state court, seeking damages for breach of contract and for costs
incurred in preparing to perform. The trial court dismissed the case on
the pleadings three times, with dismissal of the third amended complaint
making the matter ripe for appeal.
This Article details what happened over nearly nine years of
subsequent litigation challenging the sufficiency of the Quake complaint,
with no discovery during the case-in-chief. In 1990 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that American’s letter of intent was ambiguous, and
acknowledged the possibility of recovery under promissory estoppel,

1. See, e.g., Karen Ann Cullotta, In Illinois, A New Push to Combat Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
1, 2009, at A20 (discussing reform proposals); Monica Davey & Emma Graves Fitzsimmons, Illinois
Unconvinced Corruption Culture Will Fade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at A18; see also Judith L.
Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of Willie and Lucille, 89 NW.
U. L. REV. 1341, 1464–68, 1482 (1995) (discussing Oklahoma Supreme Court; Appendix D summarizes
research identifying suspect cases in which convicted Justice Welch participated, three of which
involved public construction projects).
2. Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. 1990) (affirming the decision of
the intermediate appellate court that the plaintiff stated a claim for relief, under breach of contract
and promissory estoppel, based on defendant’s letter of intent awarding Quake a $1 million
construction contract for the minority set aside project at O’Hare Airport).
3. Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990, 992–93 (Ill. 1990); see also Letter
from Charles J. Dierker, Project Eng’r., Jones Bros. Constr. Corp., to Lawrence Quamina, President,
Quake Constr., Inc. (Apr. 18, 1985), infra Appendix A (on file with Author).
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therefore remanding the case back to the trial court to receive parol
evidence regarding the parties’ intent.4 On remand, American answered
with an Affirmative Defense raising the race-related issues of
non-compliance with the MBE condition, and then with counterclaims in
1994 seeking recovery for additional expenses in obtaining a bona fide
minority contractor to perform the work. Ironically, American now
sought recovery under promissory estoppel.
Under standard contract doctrine, when some additional writing
was contemplated but never executed, courts had to determine whether
the preliminary document alone sufficed to create binding obligations or
whether none existed unless further negotiations culminated in a formal
writing.5 The common law treated this situation as an all or nothing
proposition, with the binary choice of contract or no contract.6 Courts
considered a laundry list of factors relating to parties’ intent, including
whether this was the type of agreement usually put into writing, the
extent of details and amount of money involved, and whether the
negotiations indicated the need for a formal written document.7
Traditional contract doctrine treats any precontractual bargaining
costs as sunk costs incurred¾the basic investment that negotiating
parties make to improve the likelihood of reaching final agreement and
considered a customary cost of doing business¾to improve the
likelihood of reaching final agreement and a customary cost of doing
business. Promissory estoppel had been used in very limited ways since
the nineteenth century,8 but rarely allowed relief for precontractual
liability.9
A leading contracts textbook includes Quake in a section entitled
“Postponed Bargaining: The Agreement to Agree,” discussing the
controversial topic of precontractual liability.10 Another text includes a
4. Quake Constr. Inc., 565 N.E.2d at 1005.
5. Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 674–75 (1963).
6. Id. at 675.
7. Quake Constr. Inc, 565 N.E.2d at 994 (citing Ceres Ill., Inc. v. Ill. Scrap Processing, Inc., 500
N.E.2d. 1 (Ill. 1986)).
8. Compare Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898) (discussing probate matter;
grandfather wrote promissory note for $2,000 so that granddaughter did not need to work; court
enforced on estoppel grounds), with Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845) (denying recovery on
estoppel grounds finding lack of consideration). See generally Carol Weisbrod, An Uncertain
Trumpet: A Gloss on Kirksey v. Kirksey, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1699 (2000) (discussing the “rebellious
leadership” of John J. Ormond, who wrote the majority opinion for Kirksey v. Kirksey holding that
Sister Antillico’s reliance did not count, yet simultaneously believed that Sister Antillico’s reliance did
actually create a contract); William R. Casto & Val D. Ricks, “Dear Sister Antillico . . . ”: The Story of
Kirksey v. Kirksey, 94 GEO. L.J. 321 (2006) (discussing factual background and why plaintiff lost before
Supreme Court).
9. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 195 (4th ed. 2004); Markov v. ABC Transfer & Storage
Co., 457 P.2d 535 (Wash. 1969) (explaining that liability is based on lessor’s fraudulent negotiation
behavior).
10. CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 82 (7th ed. 2012).
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similar excerpt in the chapter on mutual assent under the topic of
incomplete agreements.11 Ironically, neither textbook makes reference to
four paragraphs of the majority opinion from Quake that allowed the
possibility of recovery based on promissory estoppel alone,12 which
generated major expansion of the doctrine. The case is often cited by
state, federal, and international tribunals.
Two twentieth century cases in the United States expanded the
possibility of relief on this basis. In 1967, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
decided the path-breaking case, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.13
Hoffman, an unsophisticated baker allergic to flour, wanted to obtain a
franchise for a Red Owl supermarket.14 Over a two-year period he took
expensive steps in reliance on repeated assurances he received from a
Red Owl representative, ensuring him that he would get the franchise
only if he would complete the next step he was asked to undertake, with
each step becoming progressively more expensive.15 Red Owl never made
an offer creating a power of acceptance in Hoffman. The court
nevertheless entered judgment on a jury verdict for reliance damages
based on section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts, which provides for
the ability of a court to enter judgment as needed to avoid injustice.16 Red
Owl allowed a standalone, independent cause of action for precontractual
liability based only on promissory estoppel.
Contracts Professor Charles Knapp’s classic 1969 work, Enforcing
the Contract to Bargain, subsequently used Hoffman as support for
judicial recognition that at some point in the negotiation process, where
parties had reached preliminary agreement, the law should impose a
mutual duty to bargain in good faith; after that, liability should attach
where one withdraws for an unjustified reason not contemplated by the
parties.17 The other leading case, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. arose when
Getty Oil reneged on an announced merger intent with Pennzoil, instead
selling its shares to Texaco for a higher price.18 Pennzoil sued in the State
of Texas, then a pro-plaintiff legal environment especially favorable to
Pennzoil because of the fact that Texaco had previously moved the
company’s home office from Houston to New York. Silver-tongued

11. CHRISTINA L. KUNZ & CAROL L. CHOMSKY, CONTRACTS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 249–58
(2d ed. 2013).
12. Quake Constr., Inc., 565 N.E.2d at 1004–05.
13. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
14. See generally William Whitford & Stewart Macaulay, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores: The Rest
of the Story, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 801 (2010) (describing how reimbursing precontractual reliance in this
circumstance can be done without creating a rule requiring the same in all circumstances).
15. Id. at 809–28.
16. Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d at 274.
17. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, supra note 5, at 686–90; see also KNAPP ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 188 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981)).
18. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987).
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plaintiffs’ attorney Joe Jamail persuaded the jury to punish Texaco for
this, as it awarded a record-breaking verdict of $10.53 billion in actual
and punitive damages to Pennzoil. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed. Texaco, however, persuaded a judge sitting in the Southern
District of New York to grant a preliminary injunction against
enforcement or to obtain a lien, because Texaco claimed that the cost of
obtaining an appeal bond for the judgment would force it into bankruptcy
due to the massive amount of punitive damages awarded.19 The United
States Supreme Court then reviewed and unanimously ruled to dismiss
the federal suit.20
Hoffman and Pennzoil roiled the commercial world accustomed to
treating
those
precontractual
investments
as
sunk
(and
non-recoverable) costs incurred to improve the likelihood of completing
the deal. E. Allan Farnsworth’s famous piece, Precontractual Liability
and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations,
appeared in 1987, further cementing the theoretical foundation laid by
Knapp.21 Liability in Quake casts doubt on that usual supposition by
substantially extending risk of promissory estoppel liability in the
bargaining context.
Quake allows the possibility of standalone recovery for
precontractual reliance costs under promissory estoppel doctrine, even
absent an offer creating a power of acceptance in the party seeking relief.
Quake is cited extensively, both regarding letters of intent and for the use
of promissory estoppel as an affirmative basis of recovery.22 While many
of those citations appear in opinions by state and federal courts sitting in
Illinois, Quake’s notoriety is more widespread than that. Cursory review
of the promissory estoppel cases citing Quake raises genuine policy
concerns that the case has opened the litigation floodgates. Many federal
district court opinions have refused to enter final judgment on

19. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See generally THOMAS
PETZINGER, JR., OIL & HONOR: THE TEXACO-PENNZOIL WARS (1987) (narrating the high-risk $11 billion
battle over oil); Stuart Taylor Jr., Texaco Set Back by Supreme Court in Pennzoil Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 7, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/07/business/texaco-set-back-by-supreme-courtin-pennzoil-case.html?pagewanted=all.
20. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (precluding federal court review of
constitutional claims not raised in underlying state court action under the Younger abstention
doctrine); Taylor Jr., supra note 19.
21. E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing
and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987). Farnsworth’s concept of precontractual
liability was based on more traditional contract law, finding potential liability under “agreements to
negotiate” and “agreements with open terms,” as opposed to Knapp’s separate contract to bargain,
imposed at law to sanction improper bargaining contract. Id.
22. Westlaw search produced 376 case citations and 153 secondary sources (last updated June 11,
2017). Westlaw search produced 172 cases citing Quake and promissory estoppel (last updated Nov.
21, 2017).
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promissory estoppel based only on the pleadings.23 It is clear that the
mere assertion of a promissory estoppel claim does not insure recovery
in Illinois or other courts, although the cases are fact-specific and may
not be rationalized coherently with cases upholding possible recovery.24
Numerous practitioner publications in a range of practice areas issue
strong precautions about avoiding unintended risks in using letters of
intent.25
Contracts scholars take differing views on Quake’s doctrinal
significance.26 This Article finds that the court’s main holding, allowing
precontractual liability based on the ambigous letter of intent, is fully
supported by law and policy. By contrast, however, Quake’s apparent
recognition of a standalone claim based on promissory estoppel is
troubling. Regardless of one’s views about Hoffman, readers of this

23. See, e.g., Dugas-Filippi v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
(precluding summary judgment on a promissory estoppel claim based on fact issues); Kirgan v. FCA,
LLC, 838 F. Supp. 2d 793 (C.D. Ill. 2012) (denying dismissal where statements sufficiently
unambiguous to state promissory estoppel claim); Jaskowski v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc.,
842 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (precluding summary judgment on a promissory estoppel claim
based on fact issues); Decker v. Andersen Consulting, 860 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (precluding
summary judgment on a promissory estoppel claim based on fact issues); Lamaster v. Chi. & Ne. Ill.
Dist. Council of Carpenters Apprentice & Trainee Program, 766 F. Supp. 1497 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying
motion to dismiss; alleged promise sufficiently unambiguous). But see Brooks v. Aon Corp., 404 F.
Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (granting motion to dismiss; prospective employee did not sufficiently
allege promissory estoppel elements under Illinois or Connecticut law).
24. See, e.g., Prentice v. UDC Advisory Servs., Inc., 648 N.E.2d 146 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (noting
absence of promissory estoppel claim by limited partners in real estate investment partnership against
general contractor; claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel were mutually exclusive);
Wagner Excello Foods, Inc. v. Fearn Int’l, Inc., 601 N.E.2d 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that where
seller established binding requirements contract under UCC, no promissory estoppel claim was stated;
claims mutually exclusive). Cf. Owasso Dev. Co. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 873 P.2d 212
(Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming dismissal on summary judgment; promissory estoppel not available to
bar a Statute of Frauds defense to the alleged oral lease agreement); Camosy, Inc. v. River Steel, Inc.,
624 N.E.2d 894 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (ambiguity in general contractor’s bid proposal barred promissory
estoppel recovery against subcontractor).
25. E.g., ANDREW ULMER ET AL., 2 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT LAW THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD § 38:40 (2011); VED P. NANDA ET AL., 1 TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS §§ 4:10,
4:25–4:31, 4:44, 5:21 (2016) (indicating special risks because doctrinal variations among nations);
Thomas C. Homburger & James R. Schueller, Letters of Intent¾A Trap for the Unwary, 37 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 509 (2002); 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 4:2, 4:10, 4:13, 4:25, 8:4–8:8, 64:2
(4th ed. 2016); Kathryn Cochrane Murphy, Commercial Real Estate Leases: Selected Issues in
Drafting and Negotiating in Current Markets, on Letters of Intent, SL017 ALI-ABA 225 (2006);
Steven G.M. Stein & Joel J. Rhiner, Enforcing Letters of Intent and Handshake Agreements, 20 APR
CONSTR. L. 37 (2000).
26. Compare Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and
Torts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 695, 740–44 (2001) (characterizing opinion as “funny combination of rather
formalistic rules applied pragmatically and flexibly. . . [that] reached the right result”), with Jason
Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract
Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 483–84 n.183, 496 n.209 (1999) (discussing economic incentives for
precontractual “cheap talk” and trend in which “disappointed potential traders” can recover under
“nonpromissory, performance-based liability theory” for “failed negotiations (talk with no trade)”).
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Article may agree that Quake takes potential liability for thin reliance to
unprecedented heights. Of great importance is the fact that, because of
American’s primary litigation strategy, Quake’s claimed reliance was
never subjected to adversarial scrutiny during the litigation. That
strategy will be further detailed in a later Part of this Article.
Years ago, a junior contracts colleague prompted me to explore why
the Illinois court expanded precontractual liability on the scant factual
record in Quake. Legal narrative, which investigate detailed background
of a litigated case¾also referred to as storytelling or “legal
archaeology”¾is an accepted form of legal scholarship. Such narratives
provide practical lessons about the legal system and enable reflection on
the wisdom of a court’s ruling.27 Court records raise but do not answer
delicate issues about corruption in public works, minority set aside
projects, and the murkiness of precontractual liability. All of the judges
involved in Quake were above reproach.28 The legal, political,29 and
doctrinal30 issues remain timely.31 Construction at O’Hare Airport
27. Whitford & Macaulay, supra note 14, at 805 n.13 (citing DOUGLAS BAIRD, CONTRACTS STORIES
(2007)); Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the Navigation of The
Yellow Submarine, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1161, 1175–77 (2006); Judith L. Maute, Response: The Values of
Legal Archaeology, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 223, 224–31 (2000).
28. See Ian Ayres, The Twin Faces of Judicial Corruption: Extortion and Bribery, 74 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1231 (1997) (includes discussion of “Operation Greylord” in which numerous Cook County judges
and lawyers were convicted for bribery and corruption). For other internal references to public
corruption, see supra note 1; infra notes 28–29, 54; notes 196, 198, 275 and accompanying text; In re
Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988) (determining a one year suspension for failing to report another
lawyer’s defalcation of money owed to client).
29. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); Mario Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal
Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967 (2010); Workshop, Ass’n of Am. Law Schs., “Post Racial” Civil Rights
Law, Politics and Legal Education: New and Old Color Lines in the Age of Obama (June 8–12, 2010).
30. See Newton Tractor Sales, Inc. v. Kubota Tractor Corp. et al., 906 N.E.2d 520 (Ill. 2009)
(reaffirming Quake and citing Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores; explaining that promissory estoppel is
recognized as an affirmative theory of recovery). For scholarly debates on precontractual liability
based on promissory estoppel, see Whitford & Macaulay, supra note 14; Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v.
Red Owl Stores and the Limits of the Legal Method, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 859 (2010) [hereinafter Scott,
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Limits of the Legal Method]; Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores and the Myth of Precontractual Reliance, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 71 (2007) [hereinafter Scott,
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of Precontractual Reliance].
31. Cf. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (upholding challenge to university’s
race-conscious university admission policy supported by compelling interest in achieving critical
mass, as opposed to racial balancing for its own sake), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (2015), aff’ing,
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). Minority set-aside contracts, especially in airport contracting may be conducive
to alleged improprieties. See Peter Applebome, Atlanta Watches Nervously as Corruption Trial
Begins, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/05/us/atlanta-watchesnervously-as-corruption-trial-begins.html; see also Laurie Cohen and Dan Mihalopoulos, Firm
Retained
Minority
Status
Despite
Warnings,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Apr.
10,
2005),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-04-10/news/0504100177_1_minority-owned-city-business-status
(reporting that politically connected Hispanic businessman retained MBE status long after official
statement he would be barred from further city business); Press Release, The Fed. Bureau of
Investigation: Chi. Division, Azteca Supply, Its Owner, and Owner’s Husband Indicted for Alleged
Minority Contract Fraud, Including Two O’Hare Projects (Feb. 4, 2010), https://archives.fbi.gov/
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continues.32 Uncovered facts put Quake in political and historical
context, explaining the short duration of the contractual relationship
between Quake and American as well as the possible reasons for Quake’s
termination which were not revealed until much later, after the 1990
Supreme Court opinion. Specifically, in 1992 American answered
Quake’s complaint and asserted the affirmative defense that Quake had
not satisfied the MBE participation requirements set forth in the letter of
intent and bid requirements.33
In understanding the facts that eventually came to light, it is
important to note that they played out during the short-lived
administration of Mayor Harold Washington, Chicago’s first
African-American mayor. Washington was committed to sharing the
wealth gained from public projects with groups previously excluded by
the dominant Chicago Democratic machine. Notably, the contract facts
in Quake also occurred at the same time that Richmond, Virginia had its
first black mayor, which eventually gave rise to the 1989 Supreme Court
decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., invalidating the city’s
minority business set-aside program.34
Part I of this Article focuses on Chicago, Illinois, where both the state
and city of Chicago have established reputations for political corruption
in which patronage rewards supporters of the party then in power. Upon
election as the city’s first black mayor, Harold Washington committed to
opening the public trough to black, minority, and women-owned
businesses and professionals. It is essential to understand the volatile
and racialized political context at the relevant time both in Chicago and
nationwide. Part II details what happened in Quake, starting with the
initial transaction between Quake and American and its quick
disintegration following American’s abrupt termination of the deal.
Subparts II.B through II.D summarize the litigation through the trial and
appeal courts until the case reached the Illinois Supreme Court.
Part III then evaluates the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in
Quake, starting with the loosely written majority opinion by Justice
Calvo (or his clerks) and the superb concurring opinion by Justice

archives/chicago/press-releases/2010/cg020410.htm.
32. Current construction is identified as “modernization.” See CHI. DEP’T OF AVIATION: O’HARE
MODERNIZATION
PROGRAM,
https://www.cityofchicago.org/dam/city/depts/doa/general/pdf/
OMPSummer2010Update.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2017); see also Jay Koziarz, Planned O’Hare
Terminal Revamp Would Decrease Delays, Meet Surging Demand, CURBED CHI. (July 18, 2016, 12:53
PM), https://chicago.curbed.com/2016/7/18/12213272/chicago-transportation-expanded-terminalohare-airport.
33. Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Third Amended Complaint, American Airlines, Quake
Constr., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. 1990) (on file with Author).
34. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding based on Equal Protection
Clause, where city did not demonstrate compelling state interest and plan not narrowly tailored to
remedy effects of prior discrimination).
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Stamos. Part III.C Epilogue explores unusual events that occurred after
the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision, when American finally answered the
complaint on the merits and then filed a counterclaim seeking discovery,
which led to the trial court dismissing the case when Quake did not file
timely responses. Quake’s appellate counsel obtained reversal for lack of
notice. It was only at this time that express issues of race appeared on the
record, with a junior Katten Muchen lawyer raising as an affirmative
defense and counterclaims for what it cost American to obtain a minority
contractor to do the work. This Article concludes with an important
message to corporate and litigation counsel regarding the dangers of
precontractual liability for cheap talk on unproven reliance, as well as
about their practical and ethical responsibilities to train and advise their
clients about bargaining risks and their need to consult before taking
action that may present unwanted juridical risks.
I. CHICAGO: “THE CITY THAT WORKS” IN THE ERA OF
“BEIRUT BY THE LAKE”
Hog Butcher for the World,
Tool Maker, Stacker of Wheat,
Player with Railroads and the Nation’s Freight Handler;
Stormy, husky, brawling,
City of the Big Shoulders35

To understand the Quake decision in its political and doctrinal
context, one must appreciate the historical setting in which the case
arose. Politics determined what got done in the public arena regardless
of which party controlled. Chicago has a long, storied racial history
closely tied to the rise (and demise) of Reverend Jesse Jackson and his
Operation PUSH.36 The back story of Quake arose during the height of
Reverend Jackson’s local prominence.37
Chicago is a grand, robust, ethnically diverse city with beautiful
architecture, outstanding performing arts, museums and restaurants,
professional sports, great people, and colorful politicians. It also has a
long history of racial stress, with super segregated housing patterns
isolating blacks and ethnic minorities in poor, underserved sections of
the city that generally excluded minorities from the patronage spoils,
especially during the first term governed by former Mayor Richard J.

35. CARL SANDBURG, Chicago, in CHICAGO POEMS (1916).
36. See Organization and Mission, RAINBOW PUSH COALITION, https://rainbowpush.org/
organization-and-mission (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
37. See supra note 1; infra notes 40–57 and accompanying text.
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Daley and his administration.38 Daley called Chicago “The City that
Works.”39 Despite the seamy underside of its patronage system,
government services like garbage and snow removal tended to operate on
time. Quake, like other Illinois cases, bristles from the interplay of
politics and the dispute in question.40 Patronage was exercised by both
Republicans and Democrats.41
A. POLITICS OF THE MID-1980S: “BEIRUT ON THE LAKE”42
Following the long reign of Mayor Richard J. Daley (1955–1976),
control of the Democratic Party machine was up in the air. Mayor
Michael Bilandic, who assumed office following Daley’s death, was
defeated in the mayoral primary, which some commentators attribute to
the city’s “inability to properly plow city streets” during a major
blizzard.43 Jane Byrne was elected the city’s first female mayor in 1979.44
In 1983, Harold Washington defeated her and four others (including
38. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (invalidating patronage based dismissals when
non-civil service employees hired by Republican sheriff were replaced by a Democrat); see also Lois
Wille, Scandals Have Slid off Daley (Until Now), CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 20, 2006), http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-08-20/news/0608200020_1_scandals-silly-aides
(discussing
new pride in Chicago burnished by then Mayor Richard M. Daley, after “25 years of pummeling and
ridicule”; though troubles simmered for years before they “burst to the surface in the mid-1960s with
bloody upheavals in the misery-soaked black ghettos, the ghettos that Daley’s father, Mayor Richard
J. Daley, said didn’t exist.”).
39. David E. Rosenbaum, Daley Remembered as Last of the Big-City Bosses, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/21/us/daley-remembered-as-last-of-the-bigcity-bosses.html?_r=0.
40. See, e.g., Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1186 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting a
leading insider preference bankruptcy case commonly known as “Deprizio,” in which Judge
Easterbrook described public contractor corruption at O’Hare as “suspicions of affiliation with
organized crime . . . .”); see also Joel Kaplan & James Strong, Medley’s Conviction Casts Cloud over
O’Hare Pact, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 31, 1989), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1989-08-31/news/
8901090157_1_taxiway-removal-contract-minority (reporting the federal bribery conviction of
Chicago Transit Authority board member; Medley was also an MBE doing business on an O’Hare
project awarded during the Washington administration).
41. Charles N. Wheeler III, Gov. James R. Thompson, 1977–1991: The Complete Campaigner,
the Pragmatic Centrist, ILL. ISSUES (Dec. 1990), http://www.lib.niu.edu/1990/ii901212.html
(explaining long-term, otherwise unblemished reign of Republican Governor’s use of patronage to
reward loyal blue collar workers of his party); Editorial, Riding to the Suburbs’ Rescue, CHI. TRIB., Apr.
18, 1986, § 1, at 18 (discussing Thompson’s courting of Republican suburbanites with focus on O’Hare
noise complaints). A divided Supreme Court later invalidated Thompson’s use of patronage. See Rutan
v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990) (extending earlier patronage cases applied to various
other personnel decisions).
42. See Wille, supra note 38 (referring to 1984 Wall Street Journal reference to Chicago as
“Beirut on the Lake,” as Chicago’s “richly deserved . . . sobriquet” in which a “bloc of white aldermen
staged a race-based war against Harold Washington . . . and city government ground to a halt for three
years.”).
43. See Whet Moser, Snowpocalypse Then: How the Blizzard of 1979 Cost the Election for Michael
Bilandic, CHI. MAG. (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/The-312/
February-2011/Snowpocalypse-Then-How-the-Blizzard-of-1979-Cost-the-Election-for-Michael-Bilandic.
44. See R. Bruce Dold, When Jane Byrne Was Elected Mayor, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 14, 2014),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/chi-chicagodays-byrne-story-story.html.

Maute_32 (Medrano) (Do Not Delete)

December 2017]

12/22/17 12:39 AM

RACE POLITICS, O’HARE EXPANSION, & PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

131

Daley’s son and later mayor, Richard M. Daley) in the Democratic
primary, tantamount to election.45 A city with a large black population,
Washington became Chicago’s first black mayor.46 Washington, a
graduate of Northwestern University School of Law, served in the Illinois
legislature and United States Congress before his election as Mayor.47 He,
like other newly elected black mayors of big cities, “wasted little time in
making clear that the old rules of city contracting were going to change
the relationship between voting power and contracting power . . . .”48
Washington served from November 1983 until his sudden death on
November 25, 1987.49 Chicago politics were especially tumultuous then,
earning the label “Beirut by the Lake,” which referred to racially polarized
political conflict between the City Council and the Washington
administration.50 Within hours of Washington’s inauguration, what have
come to commonly be known as “Council Wars” began, pitting an
all-white bloc of city aldermen led by Ed Vrdolyak and Ed Burke
(commonly known as “the Vrdolyak 29” or “The Eddys”) against the new
black mayor, who was supported by 21 council members, including all of
the black and a few of the white liberal members.51 Chicago’s
governmental structure provided for a weak mayor and a strong council.
Knowledgeable observers believed that racism was behind the Council
Wars but that ideology played an equal role, with Washington embracing
a redistributionist agenda as contrasted with the more conservative

45. See Robert Davice, The Election of Harold Washington the First Black Mayor of Chicago,
CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 12, 1983), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/
chi-chicagodays-haroldwashington-story-story.html.
46. Harold Washington (1922–1987), NW. U. ARCHIVES, http://exhibits.library.northwestern.
edu/archives/exhibits/alumni/washington.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2017); David B. Wilkins, “If You
Can’t Join ‘Em, Beat ‘Em!” The Rise and Fall of the Black Corporate Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1733,
1750–51 (2008) (reporting an incident “[p]roving that Chicago politics was even dirtier than its
colorful reputation” after Washington won the primary, some Democratic politicos circulated a false
police report intimating he had been arrested for child molestation).
47. NW. U. ARCHIVES, supra note 46.
48. Wilkins, supra note 46, at 1748.
49. Id. at 1751.
50. John Helyar & Robert Johnson, Brawling City: Chicago Political Rift Deepens, Worsening
City’s Many Problems¾Black Mayor’s Election Fails to Lesson the Tensions; Is it Beirut on the
Lake?¾How Rouse Co. Project Died, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1984, at 1 (airport expansion temporarily
shelved during rift between Mayor Washington and city council); see also Vernon Jarrett, Council
Wars, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHI. (2005), http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/342.html.
51. See Jarrett, supra note 50; see also Dan Mihalopoulos et al., Feds Catch Up with ‘Fast Eddie’
Vrdolyak, CHI. TRIB., May 11, 2007, at 1, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-05-11/news/
0705111414_1_edward-r-vrdolyak-harold-washington-mayor-richard-j-daley (reporting federal
indictment of Vrydolyak for alleged kickback. The former seminarian and University of Chicago Law
graduate is described as a “consummate Chicago politician” who had often been investigated, but
never before charged with misconduct from his political dealings.).
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ideology of the Vrdrolyak 29.52 Washington’s “comparatively genteel”
background had not prepared him for “urban political streetfighting.”53
Mayor Washington took bold moves to open the spoils of
government contracts to the African-American and other minority
communities, which had long been excluded.54 This generated
controversy, particularly when it appeared that some contracts were
given to cronies lacking relevant expertise,55 or to sham minority
companies using token black participants as fronts for white-owned
businesses.56 On April 3, 1985, Mayor Washington issued an executive
52. Michael
Fumento,
Hot
Air
in
the
Windy
City,
POL’Y REV.
(1986),
http://fumento.com/government/chicago.html; Jeff Lyon, Council Wars: The Battle for City Hall,
Key Players Reassess the Wrangling and Maneuvering that Divided the City 10 Years Ago, CHI. TRIB.
(Oct. 31, 1993), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-10-31/features/9311010001_1_cliffordkelley-harold-washington-mayor.
53. Fumento, supra note 52.
54. See, e.g., Editorial, New Patronage Shows Itself, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 12, 1985),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-02-12/news/8501090101_1_bond-work-mayorwashington-million-industrial-revenue-bond (contrasting “old patronage” banned by courts, enabling
elected officials to build armies of political workers with city jobs, with “new patronage” enabling
elected officials to give lucrative work to a few friends, specifically four black lawyers given city bond
work despite their lack of experience in the field); Dean Baquet, Mayor Orders Minority Contracts 30
Percent of City’s Business to Be Reserved, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 4, 1985), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/1985-04-04/news/8501190288_1_city-contracts-minorities-mayor-jane-byrne
(discussing Mayor Washington’s executive order setting a thirty percent goal for city contracts to be
awarded to companies that are at least fifty-one percent owned by women, blacks, Hispanics, AsianAmericans and Alaskan natives, and under the daily operational control of qualified minorities). Dean
Baquet received a Pulitzer Prize in 1988 for leading a three-person team that exposed corruption in
the Chicago City Council on public construction works; since May 2014 he has served as Executive
Editor of the New York Times, as the highest ranking African American in the newsroom. See Dean
Baquet, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/dean_baquet/
index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). He prefers the term “Creole.” Born to a prominent Creole
family, his father was a New Orleans restaurateur. See New Orleanian Named Editor of N.Y. Times,
THE ADVOCATE (May 17, 2014, 5:50 PM), http://www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/
article_91bb58f9-7625-5c03-980f-85a32361bce6.html.
55. See, e.g., Steve Neal & James Strong, Bond Fees Go to Mayor’s Allies, Blacks Overdue in
Getting Legal Work, He Says, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 5, 1985), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
1985-02-05/news/8501070706_1_bond-issues-municipal-bonds-bond-field (identifying, among
others, Albert Terrell, who previously shared office space with Chicago Corporation Counsel James
Montgomery); Steve Neal & James Strong, Burke Sets New Rules for Bonds, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 1985,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-02-06/news/8501070835_1_minority-firms-bond-issues-bondwork (reporting criticism of Ald. Edward Burke, that the city steered tax bond work to four minority
lawyers who were the Mayor’s four political allies, despite limited relevant experience in the field);
Editorial, New Patronage Shows Itself, supra note 54; Mark Eissman, Bond Firms Hit Costs of
Minorities, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 1984, at C14 (reporting that Montgomery directed the city’s usual bond
law firms to affiliate as co-counsel with four minority lawyers as part of the mayor’s affirmative action
program; Montgomery defended the decision because of segregation in the Illinois legal community
and who they serve).
56. See, e.g., Dean Baquet, Mayor Scores Coup on Contract Issue, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 1985, at
1 (discussing history, with both problems and successes); John McCarron, Contractor Building
Something Bigger, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 24, 1993), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
1993-10-24/business/9310240167_1_minority-contractors-minority-owned-black-enterprise
(honoring the recognition of Paul King and UBM Inc. as Chicago’s top minority-owned construction
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order directing that thirty percent of the city’s contracts should be
awarded to minority-owned and women-owned businesses.57 The
Council Wars produced political deadlock from 1983 until May 1986,
when court-ordered special elections of seven redistricted wards were
held, resulting in an increase in the number of ethnic minority
representatives who supported Mayor Washington.58
B.

O’HARE AIRPORT EXPANSION (1980S AND BEYOND)

Expansion of the Chicago O’Hare International Airport (“O’Hare”)
has been a volatile political issue for decades. Although it is technically
located outside city limits, Chicago owns the property, finances work
through bonds, and exercises substantial regulatory authority over it.59
Corruption scandals have occurred over alleged political favoritism,
bribes, and the use of sham minority enterprises as fronts for
non-minority contractors.60 Quake arose out of the controversial

firm by Enterprise Magazine, and contrasting them with “several of the so-called MBEs (minority
business enterprises) [which] consisted of little more than a letterhead and a listing in the phone book.
A white-owned firm would do the work and pay the MBE owner a fee for lending his or her name to
the enterprise. Among the most blatant was an outfit called Precision Contractors, Inc., controlled by
Noah Robinson, half-brother to Rev. Jesse Jackson.” Precision was awarded numerous public
contracts, but reports indicated its representatives seldom appeared at work sites. Following
convictions for fraud and racketeering, he served time in federal prison).
57. Mayor Harold Washington, Exec. Order 85-2, Award of City Contracts to Minority Businesses (on
file with Author); Baquet, supra note 54; see also Dean Baquet, Lowry A Model for Minority Contract Plan,
CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 27, 1985), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-03-27/news/8501170382_1_millionin-city-contracts-minority-owned-companies-government-contracts (discussing the report of consultant
Jim Lowry, a nationally prominent spokesman for government set-aside programs as essential
economic development tools. Lowry, who had consulted with four Chicago mayors, was an influential
confidant of Mayor Washington).
58. Jarrett, supra note 50; Smith v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs for the City of Chi., 587 F. Supp. 1134
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (ordering special election), rev’d sub nom. Gjersten v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs for the
City of Chi., 791 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the district court failed to engage in proper
analysis before ordering the special election).
59. Telephone Interview with Sheldon J. Lustig, former Jones Project Director for AA terminal
expansion, transcript at 13 (Aug. 25, 2007) (on file with Author) (stating terminal expansion financed
through city revenue bonds and must meet city requirements on use of minority contractors). For
general history of O’Hare’s perpetual expansion as city-owned property, see O’Hare History, CHI.
DEPT. OF AVIATION, http://www.flychicago.com/OHare/EN/AboutUs/History.aspx (last visited Nov.
21, 2017).
60. E.g., Baja Contractors, Inc. v. City of Chi., 830 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1987) (upholding the city’s
decertification of a sham MBE contractor on the O’Hare project); Robert Enstad, 12 Road Paving
Firms Indicted in Bid-Fixing, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 1977, at 1 (discussing the 1974 runway construction
and politically connected contractors); Hank Klibanoff, Chicago’s Political Feud to Take an Economic
Toll, PHILA. INQ., Sept. 30, 1984, at A2; Debbe Nelson & Chuck Neubauer, Indictments Expected in
O’Hare Project Probe, CHI. SUN TIMES, Jan. 12, 1986, at 3 (bribes, false billings, “possible irregularities
in the choice of minority contractors”); Joseph Ryan, Delays, Doubts and Debt Project Gets Going,
but Challenges and Uncertainty Rise Behind Money Problems, DAILY HERALD, July 8, 2007,
at 1 (stating that major O’Hare expansion has been considered since at least the 1980s, with years of
political fights and extensive litigation); O’HARE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, supra note 32.
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expansion project that O’Hare announced in 1983, which proposed a
$1 billion modernization program to “bring aging and congested terminal
and roadway facilities into balance with underutilized side capacity.”61
Surrounding suburbs sued to challenge the planned expansion, raising
concerns about noise and air pollution.62 Other opponents sued to block
funding and prevent land grabs.63 Cost overruns and continuing
skirmishes caused the price tag on the project to increase from $1 billion
to $1.4 billion when the Council Wars threatened to shut down
construction in the fall of 1984, throwing a thousand construction
workers off the job.64 The 1981–1982 recession affected the construction
industry and strong inflationary pressures increased commercial lending
rates. High interest rates encouraged fast-tracked construction projects
predictably causing the need to rework changes.65
Key to the vituperative dispute at this time was the question of
whether the council’s Finance Committee would maintain its authority
to review and approve all city contracts over $50,000.66 In June 1984,
Mayor Washington, who campaigned “to break the Democratic Party’s
lock on patronage,” answered that question in the negative,
discontinuing that “time-honored, but not legally required policy.”67
Council promptly attached an amendment to Mayor Washington’s bill
requiring such approval to three pending public works bills, including
that for O’Hare’s expansion.68 Washington’s veto, sustained by his
21-member minority bloc, threatened significant economic loss.69
Delays, litigation, and cost overruns plagued the airport expansion,
including the $1.5 billion project that took place between 1983 and 1992
that gave rise to the Quake dispute.70 Upon completing one phase of
construction another immediately began, and sometimes another phase
began before the previous one even ended.71 “Battle after battle and the
61. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, AIR SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 94 (1984) (citing J. Ott, $1 Billion
Upgrade Planned at O’Hare, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH 35–36 (1983)).
62. See Suburban O’Hare Comm’n v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1986).
63. Ryan, supra note 60.
64. Klibanoff, supra note 60.
65. Frank P. Davidson & Jean-Claude Huot, Large-Scale Projects: Management Trends for
Major Projects, 4 PROJECT APPRAISAL 133, 135 (1989); See Tim Sablik, Recession of 1981–82: July
1981–November 1982, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/
Events/DetailView/44; see also E-mail from Douglas Baird, Professor of Law, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.,
to Judith Maute, Author of this Article (June 29, 2016, 10:51 CDT) (on file with Author) [hereinafter
Baird E-mail June 29, 2016] (referencing high interest rates as strong incentive to fast track, especially
because of political pressure on American to hire MBEs).
66. Klibanoff, supra note 60.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Airport Expansion Delay Claimed, ENG’G NEWS-REC., Mar. 28, 1985, at 14, 1985 (discussing
delays in $1.5 billion expansion program, expecting completion in 1992).
71. O’HARE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, supra note 32; Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of
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war seemed endless, but finally the years-long political fight over
whether to expand . . . was over.”72 If the politicians’ promises were
fulfilled, the expansion would reduce delays, improve the nation’s air
traffic flow, and ensure regional economic vitality.73
Before turning to Quake, it must be stated that political battles and
possible corruption in public construction projects are not unique to
Chicago:74 “Chicago is a test-tube case, a microcosm of the whole
country.”75 Rather, they reflect similar conflicts and alleged scandals
erupting elsewhere, with the issue of minority set-asides further
complicating matters.76 Since 1967, analogous conflicts arose following
elections of the first black mayor in other big cities, including
Atlanta¾Maynard Jackson, elected in 1974¾and Richmond,
Virginia¾Henry L. Marsh III, elected in 1977.77 Thoughtful observers
suggest that periodic rounds of ethical fervor may have unduly targeted
black officials, professionals, and business enterprises.78
For example, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., a case decided by
the Supreme Court, arose in Virginia after Mayor Marsh III spearheaded
the 1983 enactment of an MBE ordinance.79 That, and other pending
disputes, provided a compelling backdrop for all individuals concerned
about public works projects, regardless of one’s position on issues of
diversity. The Supreme Court struck down the MBE ordinance at issue in

Chicago, Mayor Emanuel and Aviation Officials Break Ground on Major Cargo Project at O’Hare
International Airport (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/doa/provdrs/
omp/news/2013/nov/mayor_emanuel_andaviationofficialsbreakgroundonmajorcargoproject.html.
72. Ryan, supra note 60.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Thomas D. Thacher II, Combatting Corruption in the Construction Industry
Combating Corruption and Racketeering: A New Strategy for Reforming Public Contracting in New
York City’s Construction Industry, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 113, 113 (1995); In re Earle Asphalt Co., 950
A.2d 918 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (upholding constitutionality of state statute prohibiting
award of public contracts over specified amount to businesses making recent campaign contributions).
75. Helyar & Johnson, supra note 50 (quoting Thomas Roeser, President of City Club of Chicago).
76. Dean Baquet & Douglas Frantz, Minority Contracts Backfire, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 25, 1985),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-03-25/news/8501160794_1_white-couple-minority-woman-owned
(discussing “widespread evidence that blacks and women were used to set up front companies for
white businesses” in various U.S. cities).
77. Wilkins, supra note 46, at 1771 (observing that black mayors, lawyers, bankers and other
businesses targeted for prosecution); Applebome, supra note 31 (federal corruption trial alleging that
MBE program “became a swamp of corruption that largely benefited white businessmen, politically
connected blacks and black public officials”). Henry Marsh, Richmond’s first black mayor seems to
have survived unscathed. See Henry Marsh, III, 2010 AFRICAN AM. TRAILBLAZERS IN VIRGINIA HISTORY,
http://www.lva.virginia.gov/public/trailblazers/2010/honoree.asp?bio=7 (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
78. Applebome, supra note 31. For more recent investigation of black officials, see David M.
Herszenhorn & Carl Hulse, In Personal Ethics Battles, a Partywide Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2010,
at A1. For further information on the ties between Thacker Construction, the Georgia-based firm
American eventually hired to assign MBEs, and Maynard Jackson, see Dean Baquet, Minorities
Seeking More O’Hare Work, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 1985, at A3.
79. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wilkins, supra note 46, at 1772–73.
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Croson in 1989, finding that Richmond had not sufficiently
demonstrated intentional past discrimination as the justification for the
ordinance.80
A key finding I have made from this research and a principal thesis
is that since the 2009 Supreme Court decision in Ricci v. DeStefano81
public actors must affirmatively justify voluntary use of racial
preferences, which may further silence frank disclosure in litigation,
heightening risk of precontractual liability for alleged reliance. Ricci
referenced risk of Title VII liability as a possible justification, making
private actors reluctant to acknowledge diversity-based motivations for
business decisions without conceding potential Title VII violations and
discrimination lawsuits.82 These constitutional and statutory rulings put
commercial actors like American Airlines in a catch-22. If they are
transparent about their objectives to encourage diversity in public
contracts, they incur the risk of certain lawsuits by disappointed
nonminority bidders. If they do not engage in diversity-related outreach,
however, and do not provide any favored treatment to qualified MBE
bidders, they then risk criticism from communities that are home to
significant populations of color who are excluded from public work
projects.
When placed in this broader context, the colorblind Quake
litigation, in which American refrained from raising any racial issues for
most of the litigation, makes sense. If the Supreme Court continues in the
direction of Ricci, requiring public actors to substantiate the need for
using racial preferences, those actors may have to be deliberately opaque
in litigating disputes where racial preferences have in fact affected their
decisions. Putting aside the external litigation costs, as a policy matter
for contract law in the realm of public works, should those issues be
silenced and excluded from public debate? Only time will tell.
II. QUAKE CONSTRUCTION V. AMERICAN AIRLINES
At first I was troubled that defense counsel avoided raising the
affirmative defense that Quake was acting as a front and did not qualify
for a MBE set-aside contract during the litigation. Over time and in light
of continuing controversies on race-conscious criteria before the United
States Supreme Court,83 I now understand that had American promptly
stated its reasons for termination it would have further inflamed the

80. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498–505 (despite evidence to the contrary submitted to City Council in
support of the ordinance); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(holding that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications imposed by any federal or state actor).
81. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (involving the permissibility of public actors
considering race in making official decisions).
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
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volatile situation then unfolding in Chicago. By waiting several years
until the political frictions had subsided, American could only then raise
the affirmative defense and counterclaims.84
A. AMERICAN AIRLINES EMPLOYEE FACILITIES AND AUTO SHOP
EXPANSION: THE BID, THE LETTER OF INTENT, AND TERMINATION
During the O’Hare expansion project, American Airlines sought to
expand its Chicago presence by undertaking $200 million worth of
projects in connection with O’Hare’s $1 billion modernization project.
American hired the California-based Jones Brothers Construction
Company (“Jones”) as the general contractor for the complex set of
projects.85 A coalition of black organizations led by Reverend Jesse
Jackson’s Operation PUSH pressured American to award thirty-five
percent of that work to minority business enterprises.86 Reverend
Jackson’s political career soared to national heights around this time,
including a strong showing in the 1984 Democratic presidential
primaries.87 He and other critics questioned American on its decision to
hire the Atlanta-based Thacker Corporation as its $2.5 million MBE
consultant instead of an established Chicago firm.88 Supporters of
Thacker maintained that the decision reflected a need for a fresh,
outsider perspective distanced from Chicago politics to help select and
train minority businesses new to contracting.89

84. Clarence Page, Jesse Jackson Treads Carefully Toward 1992, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 3, 1991),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-04-03/news/9101300579_1_jesse-jackson-presidentialrace-black-candidate (discussing Jackson’s “tardy and tepid” endorsement of black mayoral
candidate, as Author first heard him complain of low energy, Chicago’s divided black community, and
national preference for a moderate black presidential candidate).
85. Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990, 992 (Ill. 1990).
86. Baquet, supra note 78 (quoting Reverend Willie Barrow). The coalition similarly lobbied
United Airlines to improve its contracting practices. Dean Baquet & Douglas Frantz, Airline Resists
Black Coalition’s Contract Pressure, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 22, 1985, at 1 (discussing United’s $400 million
expansion project).
87. See Jesse Jackson, HISTORY.COM (2009), http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/
jesse-jackson (noting his 1984 presidential campaign won five primaries and caucuses and garnered
over eighteen percent of votes; in his 1988 campaign he won the nomination in eleven primaries and
caucuses).
88. See generally Baquet, supra note 78 (describing tension around the hiring of an
Atlanta-based Thacker Corporation). McCarron, supra note 56 (reporting that Paul King honored by
Black Enterprise magazine as top minority-owned construction firm, 1975 founder of UBM Inc.).
89. Douglas Frantz & Dean Baquet, Mayor Defends ‘Outsider’ Black Firms: Too Few Contractors
in Chicago, He Says, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 15, 1985), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
1985-03-15/news/8501140901_1_firms-contracts-mayor-harold-washington; see also Dean Baquet
& Douglas Frantz, Politically Linked Georgia Firm Key to O’Hare Contracts, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 24,
1985), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-02-24/news/8501110101_1_minority-owned-firmsminority-companies-thacker [hereinafter Baquet & Frantz, Politically Linked] (black aldermen who
recommended based on company’s size and experience). Sheldon J. Lustig recalls a private
conversation with an audience member after he spoke about American’s affirmative action strategy at
Rev. Jesse Jackson’s southside church. A man asked “who recommended Thacker to you?” When
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Late in February 1985, in response to American’s selection of
Thacker, a group of black leaders met with American representatives for
three “sometimes tense” hours to complain about their selection of
Thacker as MBE consultant.90 At a press conference that followed,
Reverend Willie Barrow, national director of PUSH, announced: “If you
fall short of the grace of God, you have to repent . . . [a]nd American will
have to repent[.]”91 Paul King, a black Chicago construction executive
whose company, Powers & Sons, was considered but not selected for that
important role, stated: “I don’t know why we need a Georgia influence
here . . . Thacker doesn’t know anything about Chicago.”92 Former
Atlanta mayor Maynard Jackson was now practicing law with an
established Chicago firm that did extensive bond work, including
financing for American’s O’Hare expansion.93 Jones maintained,
however, that it “felt no political pressure” to choose Thacker’s firm as its
MBE administrator.94
American and Jones set aside the Employee Facility and Auto Shop
Expansion on the lower level of Concourse K, a small component of its
$200 million O’Hare facilities project, for only MBEs to bid on. On
March 19, 1985, Jones published the “invitation to bid” with an April 9
deadline, just six days after Mayor Washington issued his executive order
directing that a certain percentage of contracts be awarded to
minority-owned businesses.95 Quake submitted a bid that Jones date
stamped April 13, which designated Lawrence Quamina as the company’s
President.96 Quake’s base bid of $1,060,568 listed four97 MBE
subcontractors to be paid $32,124 for air conditioning, electrical, and
plumbing work.98 Charles Dierker, Jones Project Engineer for the O’Hare

Lustig identified someone in Mayor Washington’s Public Works Department, the man appeared
visibly pleased. Lustig was favorably impressed in his dealings with the Thacker organization. Lustig
Interview, supra note 59, at 14.
90. Baquet, supra note 78; see also Baquet & Frantz, Politically Linked, supra note 89.
91. Baquet, supra note 78; see also Baquet & Frantz, Politically Linked, supra note 89.
92. Baquet & Frantz, Politically Linked, supra note 89.
93. Ronald Smothers, Maynard Jackson Wins in Atlanta, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1989, at A23
(discussing his reelection to third term). During a hiatus from office, between 1982–89, he affiliated
with Chicago-based firm of Chapman & Cutler; see also Maynard Jackson Jr.: Obituary, LEGACY.COM,
http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/atlanta/obituary.aspx?n=maynard-jackson&pid=1113182
(last
visited Nov. 21, 2017).
94. See Smothers, supra note 93. Jones Project Manager Sheldon Lustig said he first heard of
Thacker in fall of 1984 “when [an unnamed] high-ranking city official telephoned.” Id.
95. Third Amended Complaint at Exhibit 5, Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
No. 86-L01502 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 16, 1987) (on file with Author).
96. Id. The fact that Quake’s late bid was accepted is evidence that Jones and American did not
strictly comply with their own stated rules.
97. Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Third Amended Complaint, supra note 33.
98. Bid and Evaluation of Bids for MBE and WBE Participation, both required forms prepared by
American and Jones. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 95.
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project, confirmed an oral notice of award to Quake by letter on April 18,
1985. That “letter of intent” was later the basis of the subsequent lawsuit.99
Quake Construction Inc.
Attention: Mr. Lawrence Quamina
We have elected to award the contract for the subject project to your
firm as we discussed on April 15, 1985. A contract agreement outlining
the detailed terms and conditions is being prepared and will be
available for your signature shortly.
Your scope of work as the general contractor includes the complete
installation of expanded lunchroom, restroom and locker facilities for
American Airlines employees as well as an expansion of American
Airlines existing Automotive Maintenance Shop. The project is located
on the lower level of “K” Concourse. A sixty (60) calendar day period
shall be allowed for the construction of the locker room, lunchroom
and restroom area beginning the week of April 22, 1985. The entire
project shall be complete by August 15, 1985.
Subject to negotiated modifications for exterior hollow metal doors and
interior ceramic floor tile material as discussed, this notice of award
authorizes the work set forth in the following documents at a lump sum
price of $1,060,568.00.
a) Jones Brothers Invitation to Bid dated March 19, 1985.
b) Specifications as listed in the Invitation to Bid.
c) Drawings as listed in the Invitation to Bid.
d) Bid Addendum #1 dated March 29, 1985.
Quake Construction Inc. shall provide evidence of liability insurance in
the amount of $5,000,000 umbrella coverage and 100% performance
and payment bond to Jones Brothers Construction Corporation before
commencement of the work. The contract shall include MBE, WBE and
EEO goals as established by your bid proposal. Accomplishments of the
City of Chicago’s residency goals as cited in the Invitation to Bid is also
required. As agreed, certificates of commitment from those MBE firms
designated on your proposal modification submitted April 13, 1985,
shall be provided to Jones Brothers Construction Corporation.
Jones Brothers Construction Corporation reserves the right to cancel
this letter of intent if the parties cannot agree on a fully executed
subcontract agreement.
We look forward to working with you on this project.
Cordially,
JONES BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

99. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 95.
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Likely no coincidence, that same day American signed an agreement
with the PUSH-led coalition to award about $50 million of contracts to
MBE contractors, “grant[ing] the private coalition a role in identifying
legitimate minority firms.”100 The work was to begin four days later, on
April 22. The fast-track project was to start before all planning details
were final, with completion set for August 15.101 Such projects carry
inherent risks of mistakes or mishaps.102 It remains a mystery how
exactly Quake was selected among the bids submitted, as no
representative from American or Jones accepted ownership of the
selection decision. That is not surprising; the ensuing litigation gave
reason for finger-pointing among the responsible actors.
The preconstruction meeting was rescheduled from its original date
to April 25 because of airport planning issues on heating and air
conditioning (“HVAC”).103 The routine meeting introduced those
present, outlined standard procedures, and announced the rescheduled
April 29 start date.104 The meeting roster identifies those present on
behalf of Quake as Lawrence Quamina and [first name illegible]
Driscoll.105 None of the three subcontractors listed on the Quake bid
attended. And, instead of McGrew, Boykin & Associates, the company
listed on Quake’s bid for electrical work, someone from the non-MBE
Paulmarc Electric Company signed the attendance roster.106
Subcontractor Pyramid Plumbing, a notorious front, was also listed on
the bid but no plumbing subcontractor signed the roster.107 Another
subcontractor listed on Quake’s bid, Energy Enterprises, Inc., also was
not in attendance at this meeting nor was any other HVAC
subcontractor.108 However, that is understandable given the unexpected
HVAC planning difficulties that arose.

100. Douglas Frantz, Airline Promises Work to Minorities, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 19, 1985),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-04-19/news/8501230169_1_airline-s-contract-americanairlines-legitimate-minority-firms (describing unusual agreement reached after two months of
negotiations between American, PUSH, Chicago Urban League, Midwest Community Council, and
Chicago Economic Development Corp.).
101. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 93 at C189.
102. Lustig Interview, supra note 59, at 31–33. Lustig, who had thirty years of civil engineering
experience with the United States Air Force, had no prior experience with Chicago politics and limited
background implementing affirmative action programs. He had been with the O’Hare expansion for
about a year at the time in question; he left several months later. Id. at 1–2; see also Telephone
Interview with Dr. Victoria D. Coleman (Aug. 3, 2007), transcript at 10 (describing they were behind
on the project; mistakes common when project rushed to catch-up); Davidson & Huot, supra note 65.
103. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 93 at C196.
104. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 6, Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 537 N.E. 2d 863
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (No. 88-0043) (copy on file with Author).
105. See Department of Aviation Construction Section¾O’Hare Airport Meeting Roster (on file
with Author); see also Third Amended Complaint, supra note 95, at C279.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Lustig Interview, supra note 59,

Maute_32 (Medrano) (Do Not Delete)

December 2017]

12/22/17 12:39 AM

RACE POLITICS, O’HARE EXPANSION, & PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

141

Who was¾and was not¾present at the meeting determined what
happened next. It appeared that Lawrence Quamina was the only person
of color at the meeting. Charles Dierker, the Jones Project Engineer, was
struck by the absence of any minority subcontractors at the meeting, and
by the fact that the subcontractors who were in attendance differed from
those listed on the bid.109 Dierker conferred with his supervisor, Sheldon
Lustig, who confirmed Dierker’s concerns that the subcontractor
involvement was largely nonminority. They believed¾but did not
say¾that Quake was acting as “a front” for a nonminority contractor,110
leading the meeting to end abruptly.111 Afterward, Dierker and Lustig
informed Quamina of their decision to terminate Quake’s involvement
with the project, and confirmed it in writing the same day.112 Promised
follow-up correspondence never materialized, leading the week old
business relationship to spawn nearly nine years of litigation that
followed.
Dr. Victoria Coleman, an African-American Administrator of Jones’
Affirmative Action Program for the project, agreed with Dierker and
Lustig’s perception of Quake. Coleman recalled no direct involvement
with Quake. Instead she worked with the Thacker organization to
develop minority owned business for American’s projects.113 All
businesses claiming to be MBEs were technically supposed to prequalify
as such through Coleman’s office and to obtain city and federal
certification before submitting bids. Nevertheless, it was common for
businesses to circumvent that process, often with assistance from local
political actors.114

109. Telephone Interview with Charles J. Dierker, Interview with Richard Heytow, (Dec. 15, 2006),
transcript at 3–4, 8–9. Richard Heytow, who represented Quake before the Supreme Court and
through settlement said it was not uncommon that the actual subcontractors used were different from
those listed on the construction permit application; there was a high degree of informality in the
process.
110. Jones Project Eng’r (July 25, 2007), transcript at 5–8, 10–11; Lustig Interview, supra note 59,
at 19, 22, 23.
111. Dierker Interview, supra note 109, at 8, 11; Lustig Interview, supra note 59, at 32. Dierker
and Lustig state they discussed the situation and decided to terminate Quake after the meeting ended.
112. Letter from Charles J. Dierker to Mr. Larry Quamina, Quake Constr. Inc., (Apr. 25, 1985) (“As
discussed with you in our offices, we have elected to terminate your involvement with the . . . project
as of this date . . . This letter is provided in response to your immediate request. Correspondence in
greater detail will follow.”) (on file with Author). Dierker and Lustig state they discussed the situation
and decided to terminate Quake after the meeting ended. Dierker Interview, supra note 110, at 8, 11;
Lustig Interview, supra note 59, at 32.
113. Coleman Interview, supra note 102, at 9.
114. Id. at 6–9. She recalls the crazy political scene in spring of 1985, with many different forces
pressuring (or trying to “shakedown”) Coleman, Lustig, and others acting on behalf of American. It
was then common for nonminority contractors to form joint ventures with minorities or women,
falsely obtain MBE-designated work using the minority business as a front for work actually done by
nonminority contractors. Id. at 9–10. Coleman, formerly a tenured psychology professor at Purdue
University, started working part-time for American in the fall of 1984. Lustig started full time in
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If, as it now appears, Quake did not incorporate until June 1985,
Coleman stated:
[Quake] would not [have] . . . qualified to be considered. They would
not have been pre-qualified according to [her] standards . . . [that
required information that the bidder] have been established,
legally . . . current and previous projects that the business has worked
on . . . people were immediately forming corporations when they had
not previously worked together and had no history. That’s what I didn’t
like.115

An early interview with Quamina conflicts with Coleman’s
unfavorable characterization of him. He had worked on business matters
for a few years before teaming up with Bill Kent, an experienced concrete
contractor who had a successful track record with the city of Chicago.116
Richard Heytow, who represented Quake before the Supreme Court,
describes Quamina as a dapper, affable businessman.117 The
preconstruction meeting afforded only limited time to interact, and
Heytow thought it pretextual that Jones asserted reasons for terminating
Quake.118 If Jones really had a preferred contractor, they could have
selected that contractor initially and “avoided all this brouhaha.”119
Quamina later declined any further cooperation with this research
project because it brought back many painful and unpleasant memories.
In his words, “It was the opportunity of our lives and [the] road to success
[was] snatched from my hands in broad daylight in front of people.” 120

January 1985 and left in the spring of 1986. Id. at 1–4; About Dr. Victoria Dorée Coleman, THE
COLEMAN GROUP, http://www.mediate.com/thecolemangroup/pg1.cfm.
115. Coleman Interview, supra note 102, at 4–5. Quake Construction Inc. incorporated with the
Illinois Secretary of State June 26, 1985, listing Lawrence Quamina as President; “involuntary
dissolution” dated Nov. 1, 1994. As a practical matter, such partnerships could be bona fide, with the
majority contractor training the MBE contractor on how to get the job done well. OFF. OF THE ILL. SEC.
OF STATE, http://www.ilsos.gov/corporatellc/CorporateLlcController (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
116. Heytow Interview, supra note 109, at 7. Heytow represented Quake on appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court. The Author recalls taking handwritten notes when Heytow phoned Quamina to
formalize consent to discuss the case. Interview notes indicate that Kent (now deceased) had a city
“favored” construction company and that perhaps meetings took place without involving Quamina.
Heytow also mentioned “words/hints about kickbacks” and maybe money “greasing palms.” Quamina
owned sixty percent of Quake shares and seventy-five percent of subcontractors were minorities.
When Author resumed work on this project during the summer of 2007, Mr. Quamina asked her to
prepare written questions. Thereinafter, he declined further communications about the case, which
brought back much pain, anger and difficulties.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 6.
120. “It troubles me deeply, to sit and think about the event . . . The event took me to financial
bottom [and] almost led me to ruin . . . We were robbed!! The most embarrassing event I had ever
experience . . . A lot I don’t remember all of that information was written down and in the attorney’s
hands long ago. I will ponder this . . . I either have to dig up the past and recall what I can, or bury it,
forget it . . . and move on.” E-mail from Lawrence Quamina to Author of this Article (July 24, 2007,
22:46 EST) (on file with Author).
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Until December 3, 1990¾the day the Quake opinion was issued by
the Illinois Supreme Court¾no African American had ever served on that
court. That same day, African American Justice Charles Freeman¾who
swore Mayor Washington into office and who served on the intermediate
court panel on Quake¾was sworn into office.121 Freeman replaced
Justice John Stamos, author of the special concurrence in the Illinois
Supreme Court’s Quake opinion, who resigned in order to create the
vacancy for an interim appointment.122 The events of December 3, with
Stamos resigning and Freeman taking his place, corroborate my instinct
that racial concerns underlie the conduct of the squeaky clean Illinois
Supreme Court so that no one could cast aspersions on the legitimacy of
the Quake decision.
B.

THE LITIGATION
1. Initial Complaint

Quake filed suit in January 1986, nine months after the termination.
Chicago lawyer Bruce Plattenberger signed the original two-count
complaint against American Airlines and Jones.123 Plattenberger, a white
graduate of Chicago’s Loyola University School of Law, was a sole
practitioner who specialized in plaintiffs’ personal injury trial practice.124
Plattenberger was renowned for “[h]is ability to win over juries in
apparently hopeless cases . . . .”125 Quamina recalls that the “cocky
wonderful” attorney undertook the representation on a contingent fee
basis.126
Count I of the complaint alleged that American hired Jones as its
agent and, through that agent, terminated the Quake contract without
“cause and justification.”127 As a result, Quake allegedly lost expected
profits and had spent substantial sums of money preparing to perform
before receiving notice of termination. Count II alleged a nearly identical

121. Telephone Interview with John Stamos, Former Illinois Supreme Court Justice (June 30,
2012) (on file with Author).
122. As is common throughout the states, a judicial vacancy is created by resignation, which is then
filled by appointment. In Illinois, the remaining members of the Supreme Court make the interim
appointment. The appointee then runs for a full ten-year term in the relevant district through a
partisan election and are retained for additional ten year terms through nonpartisan retention
elections. Judicial Selection in the States: Illinois, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=IL (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
123. Complaint at 1, No. 86L01502 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 22, 1986), refiled on appeal, No. 91L19409 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 1991). The initial complaint requested a jury trial (on file with Author).
124. Henry Wood, Lawyer, 35, Slain on Cta Train, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 13, 1988, http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/1988-09-13/news/8801290898_1_westbound-train-gunman-passengers.
125. Jorge Casuso, ‘L’ Victim Had Trust in People, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 14, 1988),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-09-14/news/8801300246_1_train-gun-friends.
126. E-mail from Lawrence Quamina, supra note 120.
127. Complaint, supra note 123, at 2.
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claim against Jones.128 Each count prayed for relief “in an amount as
justified by the evidence and for breach of contract, plus interest, costs
and attorneys’ fees presumed to be in excess of $15,000[,]”129 which
probably was the jurisdictional minimum to invoke district court
jurisdiction, rather than ending up in small claims court. The three-page
complaint attached the bid, the letter of intent, and the letter of
termination.
Chicago firm Katten, Muchin, and Zavis appeared on behalf of
Defendants American and Jones.130 Partner Peter Petrakis131 and
associate Barbara Stuetzer132 (both white) moved to dismiss the case for
failure to state a claim, contending the letter of intent did not constitute
a contract and hence no actionable breach of contract existed.133
Alternatively, they argued that the letter’s cancellation clause authorized
termination.134 The circuit court judge granted the motion with leave to
amend, finding that the complaint was legally insufficient because “the
parties did not intend to be bound until the execution of a formal
subcontract agreement.”135
2. Second Amended Complaint
Quake promptly amended its complaint, alleging the letter of intent
was to provide assurance to subcontractors that they would be used on
the job and that Quake would enter into contracts with them. American
and Jones again sought dismissal.136 The presiding judge dismissed the

128. Id. at 3.
129. Id.
130. Twenty-four attorneys established Katten, Muchin & Zavis in Chicago in 1974. Now named
Katten, Muchin & Rosenman LLP, the firm has over 600 lawyers in the United States and London.
Firm History, KATTEN, MUCHIN & ROSENMAN LLP, https://www.kattenlaw.com/firm-history (last
visited Nov. 21, 2017).
131. Petrakis graduated from the Loyola University of Chicago School of Law in 1976, one year
ahead of Plattenberger. See Attorney Profile: Peter Petrakis, MARTINDALE, https://www.
martindale.com/park-ridge/illinois/peter-thomas-petrakis-915419-a/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). No
evidence suggests the two became acquainted while in school.
132. Loyola University of Chicago School of Law (J.D. 1981). Barbara Stuetzer surmised that the
firm was hired because she represented someone connected to the O’Hare project. Interview with
Barbara J. Stuetzer, Former Associate, Katten, Muchin, & Zavis (June 4, 2007), transcript at 1–3. See,
e.g., Jones v. Jones Bros. Constr. Corp., 888 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1989), reh’g en banc denied (1990)
(affirming after remand trial court’s fact-finding in Title VII action upholding recovery by female
plaintiff terminated from her job as O’Hare construction escort). The relevant underlying dates are
after the firm’s April 1, 2006, certificate of appearance. Nevertheless, the facts suggest ongoing need
for legal advice on American’s O’Hare project.
133. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 5, Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 537 N.E. 2d 863
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (No. 88-0043).
134. Id. at 13.
135. Circuit Court Judge Rakowski dismissed the first complaint. Id. at 2.
136. Interview with Richard Heytow, supra note 109.
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second amended complaint as well and denied Quake’s motion to
reconsider.
3. The Third (and Final) Amended Complaint
At this point the circuit court had ruled three times that Quake had
not stated an actionable claim.137 Quake persevered. Nearly six months
after filing the initial complaint, Plattenberger filed the third and final
amended complaint with exhibits, a total of 103 pages.138 For the first
time, the complaint sought recovery for detrimental reliance and claimed
that Jones waived the requirement of a writing.139 Quake attached all
relevant written communications between the parties, including the
invitation to bid; the bid itself; the letter of intent; a lengthy standard
form subcontractor supplementary agreement; a memo of delay on the
proposed start date showing the contract awarded to Quake; the
preconstruction meeting roster of attendance; and the letter of
termination.140
Once again, Defendants sought dismissal. At the hearing on the
motion, Stuetzer argued: “There is no unequivocal promise here. There
is no reliance that is either reasonable or justifiable in the face of this
clear statement that there would be no agreement until a signed
subcontract was presented. Now that is not before this Court. It never has
been.”141
Plattenberger replied that, in construing contract language, courts
can “look at the conduct of the parties. And it’s our opinion . . . that the
parties conducted themselves as if there was a deal.”142 The amended
complaint contained new factual allegations, including that:
Quake was specifically informed by the defendant that a written
contract was not necessary for them to start the job; that they had to
start the job before the written contract could be given to them; that
the contract was being typed by the defendant’s office in California;
that the contract after it was typed would be sent to Chicago for
signature, but that Quake had to start a meeting, that Quake had to get
all of its subcontractors . . . 143

137. The three different occasions referenced are the Initial Complaint, Second Amended
Complaint and the Motion to Reconsider.
138. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 95.
139. Quake asserted a fourth claim for impossibility of contract; because it was not raised on
appeal, it became irrelevant.
140. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 95, at 196–281.
141. Report of Proceedings on Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint at 3, Quake Constr.,
Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 86-L01502 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 1987) (on file with Author) [hereinafter
Circuit Court, Hearing and Order on Third Amended Complaint]. Stuetzer said a responsive brief
received the day before “cites some new authority and finally clarifies one of the theories to . . . sustain
this pleading.” Id.
142. Id. at 5.
143. Id. at 6–7.
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The day before the motion hearing, Plattenberger filed a legal memo
citing authority for a standalone promissory estoppel claim.144 He
argued:
[I]n Illinois the theory of promissory estoppel is a theory which
operates without a contract. That’s what the theory was designed for, if
this Court determines that there is no contract, and I think the Court
has determined there is no contract, the theory of detrimental reliance
or promissory estoppel is a theory which operates in that void. It’s a
theory which presumes that there is no contract.145

American made an unambiguous promise that no written
agreement was necessary to begin work, and insisted that Quake begin
work immediately. 146 In reliance on this, Quake placed a project manager
on its payroll.147
[I]f we ever do get to the proof stage, even though a week seems like a
short period of time in this courtroom, these people were out there at
this project at 5:00 o’clock every morning and were having meetings
all day. I say this only because I understand the judge may be skeptical
that these things could happen in a week. But I do believe they are wellpled facts, and I do believe they must be taken as true.148

Quake did everything necessary to begin the project, with its reliance
expected and foreseeable.149 Stuetzer countered: While there was “no
doubt” that the alleged acts of reliance occurring in the one-week time
span “may have occured[,]” it was “ludicrous” to consider the promises
“unequivocal and definite” to an extent sufficient to support a
recoverable claim for the jurisdictional minimum amount.150
Quake’s complaint was again dismissed with prejudice, making the
case ripe for appeal.151 The judge’s patience tested, he summarily ruled
on Counts I (breach of contract) and III (breach of contract and waiver
of condition precedent), stating “I ruled on it once, and I reaffirmed it.
I’m not even going to hear argument on it for a third time . . . now do you
have any other counts?”152 He also dismissed the promissory estoppel
claim, explaining:

144. Id. at 9–10.
145. Id. at 15.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 16.
148. Id. at 15–16.
149. Id. (“Quake had to begin work on the project immediately . . . ”).
150. Id. at 17–18.
151. Order, Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 86-L01502 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 2, 1987) (on
file with Author). Quake’s Third Amended Complaint included a fourth claim for impossibility of
contract; because plaintiff did not appeal its dismissal of this claim it was no longer at issue.
152. Circuit Court, Hearing and Order on Third Amended Complaint, supra note 141, at 8
(referring to a prior extensive hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss second amended complaint at
which Mr. Quamina was present). Id. at 18.
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I think the key element . . . in the doctrine of promissory
estoppel . . . has to be reliance. And in this case, there could be no
reliance in the face of unambiguous language of . . . the letter of
intent . . . reserving . . . their right to refuse to go ahead with the deal
until it committed itself in writing. And in the face of that, there simply
could be no justifiable reliance.153

The judge made it clear that he interpreted the letter of intent as
giving American complete discretion as to whether to use Quake “up to
the moment that [it] formally committed itself.”154 Until then, there could
be no justifiable reliance. He posed two hypotheticals: First, where the
general contractor solicits a subcontractor’s bid, using that bid to win the
prime contract where the general contractor induced the subcontractor’s
reliance, the general contractor is liable under promissory estoppel. In
the second hypothetical, the subcontractor submitted the bid on the
express condition the bid was not binding until the subcontractor signed
a written contract to do the work. In that situation there could be no
justified reliance because the offer was expressly made conditional upon
acceptance.155
Judge Lassers156 did not cite the famous contract cases on which his
hypotheticals were based, but it appears his reasoning was based on two
leading contract cases. The first hypothetical parallels Drennan v. Star
Paving Co., an opinion by Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court, using pre-acceptance reliance as a substitute for consideration
sufficient to create a binding option contract and holding irrevocable the
subcontractor’s bid as necessary to avoid injustice.157 Drennan is the
prime authority on which section 87(2) of the Restatement of Contracts
(Second) is based.
The second hypothetical tracks Second Circuit Judge Learned
Hand’s opinion in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., where the
subcontractor supplier presented a bid expressly qualified upon being
accepted after the prime bid was awarded the contract.158 And thus,
within the general common law that offers are revocable until
acceptance, any reliance by the offeree could not be justified¾nor
needed, because acceptance would create a binding bilateral contract.159

153. Id. at 20.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 21–22.
156. Cook County Circuit Court Judge Willard J. Lassers made all subsequent rulings on the
sufficiency of the amended complaints. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 104, at 2–3. He
received his law degree from the University of Chicago in 1942 and was admitted to practice in 1953
after military service. Between 1978–1994, Judge Lassers served in various appointive and elective
lower court judicial roles. Judicial Profile for Willard J. Lassers, in ILL. JUDICIAL PROFILES 387,
387–88 (1994).
157. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
158. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d. Cir. 1933).
159. Id. (explaining that pre-acceptance reliance is “sunk cost” to improve likelihood of reaching a
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Judge Lassers found applicable the second hypothetical, and dismissed
Count III on promissory estoppel.
Quake appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois—First Judicial
District.160 The appellate arguments took the lawyers’ professional
sparring to new heights.
C.

THE APPEAL
1. Appellate Court of Illinois—First Judicial District
a.

Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Quake Construction

Plattenberger’s succinct, well-written brief cited Illinois cases to
support the contract and promissory estoppel claims, arguing that the
trial court erred in the dismissal.161 As to Counts I (breach of contract)
and III (waiver of writing as condition precedent to existence of binding
contract), the brief maintained that Quake’s bid constituted an offer
which Jones accepted by (1) oral notice of award; (2) written notice
contained in the letter of intent; and (3) conduct signifying assent.162
Quake submitted the bid in response to Jones’ invitation for bids that
included specifications and drawings. Knowing that Quake would not
commence work without a written manifestation of acceptance, Jones
sent the April 18 letter to induce plaintiff to move forward, providing
Jones with two subcontractors’ license numbers and otherwise preparing
to start construction immediately.163
bargain).
160. Notice of Appeal, Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 537 N.E.2d 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
(No. 85L0273) (filed Dec. 23, 1987) (on file with Author).
161. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 104. Count IV, alleging impossibility, was not
pursued on appeal. See Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 537 N.E.2d 863, 865 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989). It appears that Counts II (detrimental reliance) and III (waiver of condition precedent) first
appeared in the Third Amended Complaint. See Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 133,
at 2–3.
162. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 104, at 7–8 (citing Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. MillerDaris Co., 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1970) and Jones v. Eagle, 424 N.E.2d 1253 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) for the
proposition that Illinois law “unequivocally recognizes a bid for a contract as an offer” if it is definite
and contains all essential terms). See generally CONTRACTS, supra note 9, at §§ 3.10–3.13 (2d ed. 1990)
(summarizing fact-specific determination on what constitutes offer creating binding power of
acceptance).
163. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 104, at 9–10. This argument suggests, but does not
raise, the evolving view that sometimes treats as an irrevocable offer the bid of a subcontractor to a
general contractor. See generally CONTRACTS, supra note 9, at §§ 3.23–3.26; Franklin M. Schultz, The
Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the Construction Industry, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 237
(1952) (describing general contractors’ use of bid-shopping and bid-chopping does not warrant
making subcontractor bids irrevocable); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law:
Reality and Reform in a Transactional System, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 463 (1998) (explaining the role of
relational values in deciding construction disputes); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 97(2)
cmt. e, illus. 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (The use of subcontractor’s bid in submitting prime bid acts as
reliance serving as consideration substitute to create binding option contract that is irrevocable for a
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Additional conduct by Jones further manifested an intent to
contract: “[I]f defendant did not believe that it had awarded the contract
to plaintiff, all this activity and interchange . . . was purposeless, and
merely exercises in futility.”164 The letter is a clear, unequivocal
acceptance sufficient to form a binding contract.165 When read together,
the three documents contained all essential elements of a contract,
including price, scope of work, and start of performance to begin four
days later.166 Although the letter contemplated later execution of a
written contract, that was a mere formality “to memorialize that which
had been agreed upon” and not a condition that was required to be met
before binding obligations arose.167 Assuming, arguendo, that the
contemplated writing was a condition precedent to contractual liability,
Defendant waived or was estopped from asserting its nonoccurrence.168
The cancellation clause operated only if the parties could not, acting in
good faith, agree on a fully executed contract. Because Jones summarily
terminated Quake without any good faith effort to obtain an executed
agreement, it “cannot use its own failure to shield itself from liability.”169
Count II sought recovery for detrimental reliance without regard to
existence of a binding contract.170 Illinois precedent recognized the
availability of such recovery in commercial transactions and construction
projects.171 Quake alleged sufficient facts to make a prima facie showing
of each required element: (1) an unambiguous promise, followed by
(2) reasonable reliance, (3) foreseeable by the promisor, and (4) to the
detriment of the promisee. American, through Jones, “unambiguously
promised plaintiff that it had been awarded the contract and that the
letter
of
intent
was
their
contract
and
as
such

reasonable time. As found by Judge Lassers, that line of authority has no application here, in which
Quake, the putative offeror, seeks to bind the general contractor as offeree.); see also KNAPP, ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 256.
164. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 104, at 17. Jones’ letter allegedly induced Quake to
get authorization providing Jones with license numbers of plumbing and masonry contractors. Brief
did not identify those subcontractors by name. Jones delayed the start date because of design problems
unrelated to Quake. The Memorandum of Delay distributed to various agencies and individuals stated:
“A contract award has been made for approximately $1 million dollars to a Chicago Minority
Contractor (Quake Construction).” Memorandum of Delay (Apr. 19, 1985) (on file with Author); see
also Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 104, at 10.
165. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 104, at 11.
166. Id. at 13.
167. Id. at 11–13, 16–17 (citing Inland Real Estate v. Christoph, 437 N.E.2d 658 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(granting specific performance for sale of real estate based on letter of intent with cancellation clause).
168. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 104, at 27.
169. Id. at 28.
170. Id. at 20 (citing inter alia, S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Prepakt Concrete Co., 318 N.E.2d 722 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1974)); Jenkins & Boller Co., Inc. v. Schmidt Iron Works, Inc., 344 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976); S.N. Nielsen Co. v. Nat’l Heat & Power Co., Inc., 337 N.E.2d 387 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); Ill. Valley
Asphalt, Inc. v. J.F. Edwards Constr. Co., 413 N.E.2d 209 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)).
171. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 104, at 22.
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binding . . . bolstered . . . with numerous oral” and written assurances.172
Quake reasonably relied to its detriment by performing four tasks in
preparation for the project, including: (1) expanding its physical office
space at costs exceeding $10,000; (2) placing on its payroll a project
manager at a weekly salary exceeding $500; (3) securing all necessary
subcontractors and providing Defendants with license numbers of the
plumber and masonry subcontractors; and (4) preparing to perform fully
the contract, which required substantial time and labor.173 This reliance
was “expected and foreseeable” as well as “undisputable . . . especially
where Jones kept scheduling start dates that were within a matter of days
of the contract award.”174
b.

Brief for Defendant-Appellee

Steutzer wrote the brief for Appellee, with editorial input from
Petrakis.175 The statement of facts shows that it forgot Quake dropped
Jones as a named defendant after the initial complaint, thereafter
pursuing only American Airlines.176 The argument began as follows:
“This litigation is about the effect of one sentence” as a matter of law, the
reservation of rights/cancellation clause precluded both the existence of
a contract and the possibility of reasonable reliance on any promise
made.177
At times the language almost drips with sarcasm: “Where the parties
intend that an agreement be reduced to writing and formally executed as
a condition precedent to its completion, no contract exists till then even
if the actual terms have been agreed upon.”178 Quake’s allegations of oral
statements, conduct, and the introductory language in the letter are
stated:
[I]n isolation from the crucial reservation of rights sentence. This tactic
reaches its nadir . . . [in a later argument suggesting] that the opening
sentence . . . unequivocally shows the formation of a contract.
Incredibly, Quake has structured its brief so that it might show the
court this introductory sentence, and make unwarranted
characterizations about [its effect, thus telling the court] only part of
the picture . . . [which cannot adequately be considered] without having
what Paul Harvey might call “the rest of the story.”179

172. Id. at 22.
173. Id. at 23.
174. Id. at 24.
175. Stuetzer, supra note 132, at 7.
176. Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 133, at 1 (Defendant-Appellee seemed to forget this,
mentioning Jones as a defendant in later briefs).
177. Id. at 5–7, 14–16.
178. Id. at 6; see also CONTRACTS, supra note 9 (explaining “law of conditions,” and judicial process
of interpreting unambiguous language as a matter of law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 224h (AM. LAW INST. 1981)).
179. Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 133, at 6–7. Paul Harvey was the host of a popular
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Count III, alleging waiver of writing as a condition precedent to
contract, was “a last minute desperate attempt to salvage a pleading
which had already been dismissed twice.”180 It gave no basis for relief,
because “before the issue of a waiver can be addressed there must be an
existing contract with conditions which are waived . . . In this case, the
very condition . . . which Quake said was waived goes to the formation of
the contract.”181
Defendant-Appellee contended that the elements of promissory
estoppel “are woefully lacking”:
it requires reservoirs of self-delusion for Quake to read the
letter. . . from beginning to end and . . . conclude [there was] . . . an
unambiguous promise . . . Ironically, while Quake had an acute sense
of hearing with respect to certain alleged statements, at the same time
it was apparently sightless to the actual words on the page of the letter
of intent.182

There were no specific allegations of reliance and any claimed under
the circumstances would be “absurd.”183 A footnote dismissed Quake’s
contention that “the existence of promissory estoppel factors is a
question of fact . . . [S]uggest[ing] that the doctrine . . . is some mystical
incantation which automatically and always opens the door to the jury
room.”184
c.

Plaintiff-Appellant’s Reply Brief

Plattenberger’s reply brief argued that the various documents
together comprised a written contract.185 Intent to enter a binding
agreement must be determined in context, looking at the entire April 18
letter, the parties’ conduct, and the surrounding circumstances both
before and after that document was prepared.186 Defendant argued
“solely by reference to the last paragraph of the two-page document,
ignoring the balance of the document” and the parties’ conduct.187
Correctly interpreted, the “reservation of rights” language became
operative only “if the parties [could not] agree on a fully executed

Chicagoland radio program called “The Rest of the Story,” wherein he would develop lesser known
facts that were key elements of a news story. The show might be considered the radio version of “legal
archeology” or “law stories,” including the instant work. The Rest of the Story, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Rest_of_the_Story (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
180. Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 133, at 20.
181. Id. at 22.
182. Id. at 16–18.
183. Id. at 15.
184. Id. at 18.
185. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 2, Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 537 N.E.2d
863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (No. 88-0043).
186. Id.
187. Id.
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subcontract agreement.”188 They did so agree, as the letter reflected, with
the defendant assuming the ministerial task of typing the final
agreement.189 That interpretation differed greatly from Defendant’s
contention that deferred binding duties and maintained American’s
unfettered right to cancel unless and until the parties agreed to the terms
of a fully executed contract.190
If formal contract execution were a condition precedent, its
“completion was entirely” within defendant’s control, with defendant
agreeing to finalize the document reflecting the terms which had already
been agreed upon.191 Such one-sidedness made the condition illusory,
buttressing the promissory estoppel claim. On that count, plaintiff
reasonably relied on “defendant’s explicitly stated intentions and
demands.”192 Defendant’s “consternation” about waiver was
unwarranted.193 Had it answered the complaint and pled nonoccurrence
of the MBE condition as an affirmative defense, plaintiff could have
countered with waiver.
In the procedural context, a separate waiver count is proper.194 The
deliberate defense litigation strategy deprived plaintiff from defending
on the merits when proof of compliance might have been available and
caused the litigation to drag on. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Reply Brief
unwittingly forecast Defendant’s future defense after the Illinois
Supreme Court decision.
2. Unique Proceedings Before the Illinois Appellate Court (First
District, Third Division)
At this point, readers may begin to see the subtle interplay between
race and contract doctrine, although it takes careful reading between the
lines, and does not yet expressly appear of record. At the request of both
parties, the case was set for oral argument before the Appellate Court of
Illinois, First District, Third Division, sitting in Chicago.195 Plattenberger
was killed on September 12 in a botched train robbery after briefing, but
before argument.196 Official court records state the argument was

188. Id. at 3.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 6.
191. Id. at 3–4.
192. Id. at 5–6.
193. Id. at 7.
194. Id. at 7–8.
195. Both parties’ briefs requested oral argument. Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 133,
at 1; Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 186, at 1.
196. Casuso, supra note 125. The evening of September 12, 1988, Plattenberger resisted a robbery
on a Chicago Transit Authority train, saying “That’s not a real gun. I think it’s a cap pistol.” Id. He was
shot and died instantly. Id. Friends described him as “cocky . . . . [A]lways coming up with a wise
comment . . . . [He] had a way of mesmerizing people.” At 36 years old, he was a “top-flight
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scheduled for January 11, 1989, and that “argument [was] waived.”197
Defense counsel Peter Petrakis stated that he appeared at court ready for
oral argument. He recalls that two of the three assigned judges were
African American and that Quake had a new lawyer on appeal.198
Mr. Quamina mentioned that this new lawyer was Albert Terrell, a then
prominent and politically connected African-American Chicago lawyer
who appeared at the appointed time for oral argument.199 Nothing
evidenced who appeared for Plaintiff.
After brief consultation, the presiding three-judge panel¾including
Justices White, Freeman, and McNamara¾announced the case would be
decided on the briefs alone, without argument.200 It appears that one or
more justices, perhaps Freeman or White, were acquainted with Terrell
and sought to avoid an appearance of impropriety by interacting with

attorney . . . on his way to becoming a mover and a shaker.” Id.
197. Defendant-Petitioners’ Petition for Leave to Appeal at 5, Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 537 N.E.2d 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (No. 88-0043).
198. Annual Bluebook of Justices confirms; Justices William Sylvester White and Charles E.
Freeman were African American and Justice Daniel McNamara was Caucasian, of Irish descent.
Telephone Interview with Peter Petrakis, Law Offices of Peter Petrakis (Oct. 17, 2006).
199. Terrell’s name appears nowhere in the record. Mr. Quamina mentioned that Albert Terrell
represented Quake after Plattenberger’s death at the intermediate court. See Memorandum to
Lawrence Quamina (July 17, 2007) (on file with Author); see also Douglas Frantz, Restaurant Dispute
Gets Feverish in Medical Area, CHI. TRIB., May 13, 1985; Douglas Frantz, Judge Criticizes City Law
Office, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 1985 (noting that it appeared that Terrell, a former law partner of Chicago
corporation and counsel James Montgomery under the Washington administration, helped arrange
some meetings, and the City of Chicago dropped objections after he was retained by the owners of
Popeye’s restaurant).
Albert George Terrell was born in 1954, graduated from the University of Illinois College of
Law and admitted to practice in May 1982. Telephone Interview with Jim Grogan, Deputy
Administrator and Chief Counsel, ARDC (July 27, 2007). In September 1991, the Illinois Supreme
Court approved and confirmed the report and recommendation of the IARDC Hearing Board to
suspend him for 18 months and “until further order of Court is allowed.” M.R. 7739 In re: Albert
George Terrell (Sept. 26, 1991) (on file with Author). Jim Grogan, now Deputy Administrator and
Chief Counsel of the Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois
(“ARDC”) provided the files and gave his take on what happened. Telephone Interview with Jim
Grogan (July 27, 2007) (on file with Author). Terrell appeared at the disciplinary hearing pro se
(always a bad idea in disciplinary proceedings); the three lawyers on the panel were people who were
sympathetic and inclined to give Terrell a break. Id. at 3. The transcript indicates in Terrell’s Closing
that he had the kind of personal meltdown common in discipline cases: divorce, financial problems
and mental pressure. Hearing Transcript at 47, In re: Albert George Terrell, No. 90 CH 414 (1991).
He failed to pay his 1989 registration fee but continued to appear in court on occasion, mostly in pro
bono work for family members. Id. at 28–35. He begged for, but did not receive the panel’s mercy. Id.
at 45–48. And he asked the panel to show “compassion and understanding.” Id. at 48. Grogan
described this as a “heavy hit” and difficult to get readmitted to practice after this type of suspension
and order. Id. I find this a tragic case, especially because of continuing frustration over efforts to
diversify the legal profession. It reinforces my empathy for Mr. Quamina’s decision to not further
participate with this research project, at times too painful to revisit. Terrell is now a
nonlawyer tax advisor in Chicago, apparently doing well.
200. Interview with Peter Petrakis, supra note 198; see also Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra
note 197.
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him in their judicial capacity.201 Heytow concurs with this speculation;
ordinarily the appellate court would announce in advance its plan to
decide a case without oral argument, notifying the parties by postcard.202
In historical context, this interpretation of the unusual decision to
dispense with oral argument makes sense. The infamous Operation
Greylord Scandal, in which numerous Cook County judges and lawyers
were prosecuted for bribery and perjury, “rocked the community and
exposed a judicial system rife with corruption, incompetence, intrigue,
and influence peddling.”203 Each judge on the Quake appeals panel had
an unblemished record and was highly respected in the legal
community.204 The year before, in 1988, the Illinois Supreme Court
decided In re Himmel, suspending a lawyer for failing to report another
lawyer’s known embezzlement of client funds.205 Because of the lingering
bruises from Operation Greylord, the courts had a heightened sensitivity
to ethics propriety, with judges careful to avoid any conduct that might

201. The postcard system may also reflect a judicial tendency to reduce the number of oral
arguments in Illinois Appellate Courts. See Gino L. DiVito, Surviving the Death of Oral Argument, 99
ILL. B.J. 188 (2011).
202. Interview with Richard Heytow, supra note 109, at 12.
203. Richard Lindberg, No More Greylords?, IPSN.ORG (1994), http://www.ipsn.org/greylord.
html. The investigation and prosecutions spanned thirteen years, indicting ninety-two judges, lawyers,
detectives, police officers, and court officials. Id. The last conviction was obtained in 1993. Id.
204. Justice William Sylvester White, author of the majority opinion, was born in 1917, received
his A.B. and J.D. degrees from the University of Chicago; he then had a distinguished career in the
U.S. Navy. Before his 1980 election to the First District Appellate Court in 1980, he served Cook County
circuit judge (1964–1980), as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois and
Assistant Cook County State’s Attorney, as Deputy Commissioner of the Chicago Department of
Investigation and in other prominent positions. Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, ILL. BLUE BOOK
1989–90 (on file with Author) [hereinafter 1987–89 ILL. BLUE BOOK]. William Sylvester White,
Ex-Illinois and Appellate and Juvenile Court Judge, Dies, JET, Mar. 8, 2004, at 15.
Charles E. Freeman, concurring with Justice White, was born in 1933; received his undergraduate
degree from Virginia Union University, served in the Army (1956–58) and received his law degree
from John Marshall Law School (1962). Voters elected him to the Cook County Circuit Court
(1976–82) and the First District Appellate Court (1982–90) and the Supreme Court in 1990. Id.
Notably, he swore Mayor Washington into office. Judicial Profile for Charles E. Freeman, in ILL.
JUDICIAL PROFILES, 239 (1994).
Justice Daniel J. McNamara, who dissented, was born in Chicago in 1921, received his
undergraduate degree from Notre Dame (1942), served in the Navy during World War II and then
received his law degree from DePaul (a Jesuit school) and admitted to practice in 1948. George H.
Ryan, Secretary of State, ILL. BLUE BOOK 1997–98) (on file with Author) [hereinafter 1997–98 ILL.
BLUE BOOK]; Judicial Profile for Daniel J. McNamara, in ILL. JUDICIAL PROFILES, 474 (1994).
205. In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Ill. 1988); Telephone Interview with James J. Grogan,
Deputy Administrator and Chief Counsel, Illinois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission of
the Supreme Court of Illinois (June 26, 2012) [hereinafter Grogan June 26, 2012, Interview]. Justice
Stamos, author of the special concurring opinion in the Supreme Court Quake decision also authored
Himmel, which some legal ethics experts consider the most important ethics decision of the twentieth
century. Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap
for Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259 (2003). It certainly woke up Illinois lawyers¾Illinois has the
highest frequency of reporting, including self-reporting, in the United States. Id. at 273.
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be perceived as unseemly.206 Justice Freeman served on the appellate
bench beginning in 1976 until December 3, 1990, when he was sworn in
as the state’s first African-American member of the Illinois Supreme
Court¾the same day that court decided Quake. At his swearing-in
Justice Freeman stated: “The public perception of the judicial branch of
government is at an all-time low. We must address that perception.”207
On March 29, 1989, after nearly four years of litigation, the Illinois
Appellate Court, First District, reversed and remanded in a split decision,
with Justice McNamara dissenting.208 As is common, the majority and
dissent reflect opposite facts and law.
Justice William S. White, educated at the University of Chicago,
authored the lucid majority opinion reflecting modern legal realism.209
Because the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, the
appellate court was required to take as true all well-pled facts in the
complaint and all reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom,
and to interpret them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Dismissal was improper unless “no set of facts could be proved that
would entitle the plaintiff to relief.”210 After summarizing the factual
allegations for dismissal of each count raised on appeal, the court
reversed and remanded, finding sufficient the contract and promissory
estoppel claims. The determinative finding was that the letter of intent
was ambiguous, requiring the factfinder below to receive parol evidence
and to decide upon the parties’ intent, taking into account all the relevant
facts and circumstances. Even absent a finding of a binding contract
created by the documents, the complaint stated sufficient allegations for
independent recovery under promissory estoppel.
With respect to the contract formation issue, where a writing was
contemplated but not executed, the court quoted the familiar standard
on the importance of intent:
If the parties to the writing intended that it be contractually binding,
that intention would not be defeated by the mere recitation in the
writing that a more formal agreement was yet to be drawn . . . . [If] the
language is ambiguous, the construction of the writing is a question of
fact, and parol evidence is admissible to explain and ascertain what the
parties intended.211

206. Telephone Interview with Mike Trucco, Litigation Partner at Stamos & Trucco, LLP (June 25, 2012).
207. William Grady, Illinois Supreme Court Swears in 3 Members, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 4, 1990),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-12-04/news/9004110293_1_illinois-supreme-court-appell
ate -judge-appellate-courts.
208. Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 537 N.E.2d 863 (Ill. App. 1989).
209. Email from Judith Maute, Author, to Douglas Baird (June 27, 2012, 1:27 PM CST) (on file
with Author) (concerning overlap in time and whether Justice White studied with Karl Llewellyn).
210. Quake Constr., Inc., 537 N.E.2d at 865.
211. Id. at 866 (internal citations omitted throughout).
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Parsing the letter of intent within the context of the alleged
surrounding circumstances, the majority found that it supported a
reasonable inference that the parties intended that work begin prior to
execution of the formal contract, which would then be governed by the
letter’s terms.212
[L]anguage referring to [Jones’] reservation of right to cancel the letter
if the parties could “not agree on a fully executed subcontract
agreement.” . . . is itself ambiguous and supports both
constructions . . . [I]t may be construed [that the executed writing] is a
condition precedent [to formation of the contract] . . . [but] there would
be little need to provide for [its] cancellation . . . if the parties did not
intend to be bound by it . . . [T]he statement [also] implie[s] that the
parties could be bound by the” letter absent the fully executed contract.213

Because the trial court erred in finding the letter unambiguous, the
appellate court found that the matter had to be reversed and remanded
so the factfinder could consider parol evidence in making its
determination of the parties’ intent as to contract formation and waiver
of a formal writing. Even if no contract was formed, further findings
needed to be made on whether the alleged reliance was reasonable.214
Justice McNamara’s dissent suggests a traditional Willistonian
perspective, stating strong policy concerns focused on the need for
predictability and the long-established Illinois precedent “that parties
may expressly provide that negotiations are not binding until a formal
agreement is reduced to writing and executed.”215 The dissent also
suggests acute awareness that the burgeoning city of Chicago provide a
welcome legal environment for the business community.
Justice McNamara found the key language of the letter of intent in
its second and last sentences:
A contract agreement outlining the detailed terms and conditions is
being prepared and will be available for your signature
shortly . . . [Defendant] reserves the right to cancel this letter of intent
if the parties cannot agree on a fully executed subcontract
agreement.216

Justice McNamara stated that this language “is incapable of being
understood in more senses than one. We have repeatedly held such
language to be unambiguous” so the court could discern parties’ intent as
a matter of law and without the need to delve into parol evidence. He
referenced a case not cited by either party, stating “[t]he parties are
entitled to shape a letter of intent as they wish.”217 To find this language

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 867.
Id.
Id. at 867–68.
Id. at 869.
Id.
Id. (citing Feldman v. Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1214, 1221 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Schek
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ambiguous “would ignore these cases and would deprive negotiating
parties of all precedence and guidance in how best to draft a letter of
intent so as to avoid a contractually binding effect.”218 Justice McNamara
would have enforced the requirement of executing a formal contract as a
condition precedent to formation and would have upheld the trial court’s
dismissal, finding that the letter of intent was unambiguous.219
D. APPEAL TO ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT
1. American Airlines’ Petition for Leave to Appeal
American sought leave to appeal and asked the Illinois Supreme
Court to “reverse the 2 to 1 decision of the Appellate Court and affirm the
trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s third amended complaint.” The
brief Procedural History and Prayer for Leave to Appeal emphasized the
repeated dismissal of each of Quake’s Complaints by two different trial
judges who each held that “no enforceable contract came into existence
between the parties.” It stressed Justice McNamara’s dissent in which he
agreed that the letter of intent did not show an intent to enter into a
binding contract.220
The Statement of Facts was apparently written in haste, misstating
the date of the letter of intent and other facts221 and asserting that the
reservation of rights clause and language referring to the execution of a
written subcontract agreement created conditions to the formation of a
contract.222 It referred to Petitioners’ American Airlines and Jones
collectively as “Jones” and dismissed the two parties’ relationship in two
sentences before reciting from each of the three Complaints.223 The brief
echoed the colorful adjectives from its brief to the court below. For
example, it characterized as speculative Quake’s insistence that the letter

v. Chicago Transit Auth., 247 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1969))).
218. Quake Constr., Inc., 537 N.E.2d at 869. The letter evidenced a lesser undertaking by the
parties, a precursor to a valid and enforceable agreement. Id. at 869. Further, the words “awards” and
“cancels” did not alter the established interpretation of the unambiguous second and last sentences.
Id. It omitted many essential terms of the contract. Id. at 870.
219. Id. at 869.
220. Defendant-Petitioner’s Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 197, at 24. The thirty-seven
page Petition contained a four-part brief and short Appendix. The brief contained a Procedural History
and Prayer for Leave to Appeal, a Statement of Facts, and a four-part Argument. Four exhibits
comprised the appendix: (1) Exhibit A, the Appellate Court Opinion; (2) Exhibit B, Jones’ Affidavit of
Intent to File Petition for Leave to Appeal, with a Notice of Filing to the Appellate Court and Proof of
Service; (3) Exhibit C, the April 18, 1985 Letter of Intent from Jones to Mr. Quamina; and
(4) Exhibit D, the Table of Contents of Record on Appeal to the Appellate Court.
221. Id. at 3 (stating the date of the letter of intent as April 25, 1988—three years after the correct
date the 1985 letter was written and date filed suite (correctly Jan. 22, 1986), both typographical errors
missed in proofreading).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 3.
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of intent sought to induce reliance, deplored Quake’s reference to
extrinsic documents as an attempt “to piece together” an enforceable
contract, and alleged that the lack of a formally executed contract was an
“insurmountable” barrier to relief.224
The Argument restated its main argument from below: “This
litigation is about the effect of one sentence[;]”225 as a matter of law, the
reservation of rights/cancellation clause both precluded the existence of
a contract and absence of reasonable reliance on a promise. It stressed
Justice McNamara’s dissent, which discussed the resulting public policy
implications if letters of intent became binding;226 classifying the
reservation of rights clause as ambiguous would create uncertainty for
other businesses wishing to use letters of intent without risk of
contractual liability.227 Because of the growing use of such letters in
business, Defendant-Petitioners “believe that Justice McNamara rightly
saw the difficulty which negotiating parties will have in finding limiting
words which the majority in this case would not consider ambiguous.”228
Quake stated no breach of contract claim because execution of a
formal written agreement was a condition precedent. “Where the parties
intend that an agreement be reduced to writing and formally executed as
a condition precedent to its completion, no contract exists till then even
if the actual terms have been agreed upon.”229 It distinguished Quake’s
cited cases, supplementing the argument with the interpretations of “two
judges of the circuit court, and Justice McNamara” who:
[o]n five separate occasions . . . found that the reservation of rights
language was a condition precedent . . . limit[ing] the effect of the letter
of intent to a nonbinding, cancellable letter of intent which, in the
words of Judge Lassers, ‘means that Jones is not bound until they sign
on the dotted line.230

Nor did the complaint state a claim under promissory estoppel
because there was no reasonable reliance.231 Reliance is not reasonable

224. Id. at 4–5.
225. Brief and Argument for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 133, at 5, 14–16; DefendantPetitioner’s Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 197, at 7.
226. See 110A ILL. COMP. STAT. ¶ 315(a) (West 2017) (stating that appeals are a matter of sound
judicial discretion and listing the general importance of the question presented as a factor to be
considered by the Court in granting leave to appeal).
227. Defendant-Petitioner’s Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 197, at 7–8 (citing Quake
Constr., Inc., v. Am. Airlines Co., Inc., 537 N.E.2d 863, 918 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (McNamara, J.,
dissenting)).
228. Defendant-Petitioner’s Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 197, at 8.
229. Id. at 15 (quoting In re Marriage of Chaltin, 506 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (emphasis
added).
230. Defendant-Petitioner’s Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 197, at 16 (quoting Transcript
of Proceedings at 24, Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 86-L-01502 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 18,
1987)).
231. Defendant-Petitioner’s Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 197, at 21 (citing S.N. Nielson
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“where a condition precedent to the formation of a contract was not
fulfilled.”232 Finally, the complaint stated no waiver claim: “[w]e are
frankly at a loss to understand precisely what cause of action was
intended to be alleged by Count III.”233 Whatever was intended, it should
not be a separate count; any question of waiver belongs under a breach
of contract claim, and any question of estoppel belongs with the
promissory estoppel claim.234 “This fundamental inadequacy in the
waiver/estoppel count can be expressed by recognizing that Quake has
simply placed the cart before the horse. Before the issue of waiver can be
addressed there must be an existing contract with conditions which are
waived or subject to estoppel.”235
2. Brief and Argument for Plaintiff-Appellee Quake Construction
The Illinois Supreme Court granted Petitioners’ leave to appeal on
October 5, 1989.236 Quake filed its Brief and Argument on January 16,
1990.237 Quake’s new counsel on appeal, Richard Heytow, a 1977
graduate of the Chicago-Kent College of Law, signed the sparse fourteenpage brief.238
The two paragraph Statement of Facts contested Appellant’s
characterization of the letter of intent.239 Where Appellant’s Statement of
Facts tied facts together into self-serving legal conclusions, Appellee
recited language pointing to binding intent that Jones “elected to award

Co. v. Nat’l Heat & Power Co., 337 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)).
232. Defendant-Petitioner’s Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 197, at 22. The Argument also
quotes the trial court’s assertion that “there could be no reliance in the face of the unambiguous
language . . . [which] reserved to American Airlines their right to refuse to go ahead with the deal
unless and until it committed itself in writing.” Id. (citing Transcript of Proceedings at 20, Quake
Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 86-L-01502 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 1987)).
233. Defendant-Petitioner’s Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 197, at 22.
234. Id. at 22–23.
235. Id. at 23.
236. Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 545 N.E.2d 130 (Ill. 1989).
237. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990 (Ill.
1990) (No. 68585). Jones and American did not need to file a brief; under 110A ILL. COMP. STAT.
¶ 315(h) (West 2017), “[i]f leave to appeal is allowed, the appellant may allow his or her petition for
leave to appeal to stand as the brief of appellant . . . .” While court rules specify thirty-five days for
Appellee to respond after Appellant’s brief is filed, it apparently allowed an extension of time due to
Quake’s change of counsel. Id.
238. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 237, at 14; Richard D. Heytow, then Crystal & Heytow,
P.C., was primarily an insurance defense lawyer with a significant appellate practice. It was pure
happenstance that he came to represent Quake and Quamina; he does not recall the amount of fee finally
paid but was certain it was on a contingent fee basis. He first became involved after the Supreme Court
granted discretionary review and continued until the matter was settled. The court held oral arguments,
but no suggestion was made that it was a novel case. Heytow Interview, supra note 109, at 1, 14.
239. Brief and Argument for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 237, at 14.
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the contract for the subject project,” and the letter referred to “this notice
of award.”240
Part I addressed Quake’s breach of contract claim. The letter of
intent was not a condition precedent to the formation of a valid contract.
Appellant’s focus on “the effect of one sentence”241 ignored contrary
language evident throughout the remainder of the document.242
Following the majority opinion below, Heytow referenced the letter’s use
of terms such as “award,” enumeration of the price and details of
performance, and other facts, proving “[i]t is clearly more than a letter of
intent . . . intended to inform the Plaintiff that the Defendant has ‘elected
to award the contract’ to the Plaintiff.”243 Taking the document as a
whole, the “one sentence” in contention presents not a condition
precedent, but rather a statement whose meaning is “nebulous.”244 Even
if a fully executed agreement was a condition precedent, that condition
had been complied with; the Complaint alleged that “a written contract
had . . . been agreed upon” and “all of the material elements had been
agreed upon and . . . Plaintiff had done everything requested of it by the
Defendant.”245 Heytow disagreed with Justice McNamara’s
characterization of “‘requests for bids’ as ‘non-binding’ [sic] or
preliminary’ [which] fails to understand that “all of the ‘preliminary’ or
‘non-binding’ [sic] documents had already been submitted, reviewed,
accepted and adopted by reference in the letter.”246 The majority decision
below correctly applied Illinois precedent that the language contained in
the letter was ambiguous.247
Part II addressed the promissory estoppel claim, contending the
underlying facts supported each required element: “[I]n reliance upon
the words and deeds of the Defendant, the Plaintiff changed its position
and incurred substantial expenses and expended substantial time in
complying with Defendant’s demands.”248 Quake’s reliance was not
“unreasonable as a matter of law;” legitimate questions of fact remain for
the trial court, including “whether the parties intended to be bound by

240. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 237, at 2.
241. Id. at 3 (citing Petition for Leave to Appeal, supra note 197, at 7).
242. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 237, at 3.
243. Id. at 4; see Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 537 N.E.2d 863, 866–67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
244. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 237, at 3.
245. Id. at 6–7.
246. Id. at 7 (citing Quake Constr., Inc., 537 N.E.2d at 869 (McNamara, J., dissenting) (stating that
terms such as price “would typically be included in any initial request for bids.”)).
247. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 237, at 8–10 (reasserting the Appellate Court’s
construction of Illinois case law regarding . . . letters of intent as ambiguous); see Quake Constr., Inc.,
537 N.E.2d at 866–67 (citing Intini v. Marino, 445 N.E.2d 460, 463 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Inland Real
Estate Corp. v. Christoph, 437 N.E.2d 658, 660 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Chi. Inv. Corp. v. Dolins, 418 N.E.2d
59, 62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Interway, Inc., v. Alagna, 407 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)).
248. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 237, at 11.
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the letter, whether a condition precedent existed, whether the condition
was complied with and whether the condition was waived.”249 Whether
there was reliance, as alleged, was a disputed question of fact not to be
determined on the pleadings.250
3. Reply Brief and Argument of Defendant-Appellant
American Airlines
Appellant’s eight-page Reply Brief conceded “to the shortness of
human life[,]” addressing only a few issues brought up by Appellee’s
brief, which was “essentially faithful to the majority opinion of Justices
White and Freeman [in the lower appeals court], merely adorning their
points” “in the slightly different raiment of adversary armor rather than
judicial robes.”251
First, Quake’s focus on a wider scope of the letter improperly
implied that “a quantitative assessment of which party can make more
allegations about words or deeds” settles the issue of intent.252 Rather,
the one-sentence condition precedent was established with little
elucidation.253 Quake wrongly implies that “every allegation made in the
complaint must somehow be treated as gospel.”254 Because the letter of
intent is an exhibit, it controls when “the ‘facts’ alleged are contradicted
and controlled by the operative language of the letter of intent which
indicates just the opposite.”255 Even the appellate court majority “dealt
with the language of the letter of intent and the question of whether it
was ambiguous” because it implicitly acknowledged that “the exhibit
controlled the allegations of the complaint rather than vice versa . . .”256
Quake’s “geographical argument . . . that the language on which Jones
relies comes at the very end of the letter of intent” was unsupported by
Illinois authority requiring that language of condition be placed at the
beginning—or at any specific location—of a document.257 Quake’s claim

249. Id. at 12.
250. Id. at 13.
251. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 1, Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d
990 (1990) (No. 68585); see 110A ILL. COMP. STAT. ¶ 315(h) (West 2017) (permitting an appellant to
“file a reply brief within 14 days of the due date of appellee’s brief . . . [i]f an appellee files a brief.”).
252. Id. at 1–2.
253. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 1–2, Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d
990 (1990) (No. 68585).
254. Id. at 2.
255. Id. at 2–3 (citing Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 30 F. Supp. 173, 177 (S.D. Ill. 1939), aff’d
113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1940); Panorama of Homes, Inc. v. Catholic Foreign Mission Soc’y., Inc.,
404 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Wilbur Waggoner Equip. Rental & Excavating Co.
v. Johnson, 342 N.E.2d 266, 269 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)).
256. Reply Brief and Argument of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 251, at 3.
257. Id. at 3. While Quake’s Brief did not base any of its arguments on the physical location of the
disputed portion of the letter, it did state that the last substantive page of the letter, the only one
considered by the Trial Court and the one focused upon by the Defendant to the exclusion of all others,
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that final ities of the construction industry which bear on the
interpretation of this letter of intent.”258 Because construction contracts
such as this involve a high level of value and complexity, “it is naïve to
suggest . . . that this letter of intent amounts to a binding contract and
leaves ‘virtually nothing else of substance to be negotiated.’”259
Part II reiterated the inadequacy of Appellee’s promissory estoppel
pleadings, which neither alleged reliance nor that any reliance would be
reasonable.260 It is inconsistent to assert that Jones made an
unambiguous promise while also asserting that the letter of intent was
ambiguous.261 Quake merely alleged conclusory facts and “gloss[ed] over
its pleading defects by falling back on its earlier contention that ‘facts’
relevant to the missing elements ha[d] been admitted.”262 Part III
contended that Quake merged Counts II and III, but did not outline each
cause of action “with even the most liberal pleading standard.”263 Quake’s
limp attempt to “bootstrap Count II into Count III (or vice versa)” left
contrary arguments “unchallenged.”264
III. DECISION OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT
The Illinois Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, agreeing with the
court below that, because the letter of intent was ambiguous, dismissal
was improper because intent had to be determined by the trier of fact.265
As noted in the Introduction of this Article, Quake is excerpted in two
contracts textbooks in sections on contract formation and precontractual
liability.266 Both omit the four most significant paragraphs of the court’s
opinion finding that Count II on promissory estoppel also states an
actionable claim.267 A third textbook cites Quake in a footnote in its
section on precontractual reliance.268

is . . . ambiguous . . . . It is noteworthy that although the letter awards the contract to the Plaintiff,
provides notice of the award and authorizes the work, the first and only time the Defendant refers to
the letter as a letter of intent is at the end. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 237, at 5–6.
258. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 251, at 3.
259. Id. at 4. This misquotes Quake’s Brief, which states that “virtually all of the material elements
have been agreed upon and accepted in the letter.” Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 237, at 6.
260. Id.
261. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 251, at 5–6.
262. Id. at 5.
263. Id. at 7.
264. Id. (citing Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 133, at 20–24; referring to Petition for
Leave to Appeal, supra note 197, at 22–23).
265. Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990, 1005 (Ill. 1990).
266. See supra notes 10, 11.
267. Quake Constr., Inc., 565 N.E.2d at 1004–05.
268. MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 29, at 317 (note 564 cites Rosnick v. Dinsmore,
457 N.W.2d 793, 800 (Neb. 1990)); Quake for the proposition that “[s]everal courts hold that the
promise necessary to activate promissory estoppel need not amount to an offer or otherwise include
all of the elements of a contract[,]” that is, Quake as authority for estoppel as a standalone basis for
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If Quake’s precedential value were limited to that of contract
formation and the need for parol evidence on what the parties intended
the letter of intent to accomplish, this would be unremarkable except for
the fact that doctrinal analysis ignored the sensitive racial backstory that
appeared nowhere in the record until the very end. Of greater import,
however, is that the court upheld the promissory estoppel complaint and
remanded for further proceedings with scant allegations to support the
required elements. As discussed earlier, this expanded use of promissory
estoppel in a large variety of instances may incentivize foolish reliance
and punish bargaining sloppiness.269
Illinois continues to elect all judges.270 The biographies of Justice
Horace L. Calvo, whose name appears on the majority opinion, and
Justice John J. Stamos, author of the special concurring opinion, are as
sharp a contrast as the opinions themselves. In studying the opinions, I
was struck by the vast difference in writing, legal analysis, and mastery
over the delicate policy issues in the case. The sharp contrast warrants
consideration of the significant differences in their educational,
professional backgrounds and legal perspectives at the time the case was
decided.
Justice Calvo was a Democrat from downstate Illinois, Fifth District,
elected to a ten-year term in November 1988, and served from
December 1988 until his death on June 3, 1991, after a long battle with
cancer.271 He was likely ill during the months preceding the issuance of
the December 3, 1990, opinion. Born in Chicago in 1927, his parents soon
moved downstate.272 Calvo’s weak educational background273 did not

recovery.
269. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text; see also supra note 26 (regarding “cheap talk”).
270. See Peter C. Alexander & George M. Vineyard, A Proposal to Select Illinois Appellate and Supreme
Court Justices, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 22 (Oct. 13, 2017) (discussing intermittent proposals to abandon judicial
election in favor of what is known as merit selection; such efforts are thwarted by suspicion that it would
move discussion to political backrooms).
271. See Michael Gillis, State High Court Justice Horace L. Calvo, 64, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 4, 1991, at
63; Beverley Scobell, Electing Justices to Illinois Supreme Court, ILL. PERIODICALS ONLINE (1992).
272. See Gillis, supra note 271 at 63.
273. He took two years of night courses at the now-defunct Lincoln College of Law in Springfield
and transferred to St. Louis University where he was enrolled for two years, but did not graduate. He
passed the bar on the third try and received an Illinois license in 1956. These facts became public
during his campaign for the Supreme Court. After World War II, Illinois and other states offered
returning veterans an expedited means of licensure. Grogan June 26, 2012 Interview, supra note 205.
Calvo served in the Air Force from 1944–47. There is no clear record of his activities from 1947 until
1953. He attended St. Louis University School of Law (“SLU”) from 1953–54. E-mail from Elizabeth
Stookey, Assistant Dir., Development and Alumni Relations at SLU (June 28, 2012, 13:54 CST) (on
file with Author). Illinois did not require law degree for admission until 1967. The only eligibility
requirement for judicial office is a law license. Joseph R. Tybor & Maurice Possley, No Degree No Bar
to Judgeship, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 17, 1988. Between 1956 and 1975 he worked variously as a private
practitioner, assistant Illinois attorney general and representative in the Illinois House of Legislature.
He was then appointed to fulfill an unexpired term in the Circuit Court (trial level) where he served
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impede his political success, having served in all three branches of
government representing a judicial district known in legal circles for
being pro-plaintiff. That should not surprise anyone familiar with Illinois
political history, or with similar judicial districts around the country.
By contrast, Justice Stamos’ special concurrence reflected deep
mastery of contract doctrine, policy, scholarship, and interpretation of
letters of intent as they might arise in different factual contexts. I liken it
to the kind of nuanced, deep intellectual reasoning of University of
Chicago Professor Douglas Baird or Karl Llewellyn.
On April 20, 1988, the Illinois Supreme Court appointed Justice
John Stamos to finish the unexpired term of a justice who resigned.274 Of
the twenty-five applicants, he was one of four rated the highest by three
bar groups who evaluated the candidates.275 He “had close ties with the
regular Democratic Party in the past but also . . . a reputation for
independence.”276 Born in 1924 and raised on the Southside of Chicago
where the stench of steel mills permeated the air, Stamos studied pre-law
at DePaul University until drafted to serve in World War II.277 Because
an undergraduate degree was not then required for bar admission,
Stamos returned to enter DePaul College of Law where he received the
LL.B. and was admitted to practice in 1949.278
Despite his affiliation with the Cook County Democratic Party
during the Daley administration, his long professional record remained
unblemished.279 He served over twenty years on the Illinois Appellate

until 1987 when he was assigned to the Appellate Court (5th District). The next year he beat three
candidates from his district for election to the Supreme Court. Gillis, supra note 271, at 63. Some, but
not all this information is contained in his official Supreme Court biography. Horace L. Calvo:
Previous Illinois Supreme Court Justice, ILL. COURTS, http://www.state.il.us/COURT/
SupremeCourt/JusticeArchive/Bio_Calvo.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
274. Joseph R. Tybor, State High Court Picks Stamos Appellate Judge to Take Simon’s Spot, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 21, 1988. Justice Seymour Simon stepped down for personal reasons unrelated to any cloud
of suspicion. Grogan June 26, 2012 Interview, supra note 205.
275. Tybor, supra note 274. Illinois judges are still selected through partisan elections. This
selection, on the heels of Operation Greylord, increased pressure for merit-based appointments. The
Chicago Council of Lawyers said he had “‘an excellent reputation for integrity’ whose opinions are ‘well
researched, clear and cogent.’” Id. The Illinois State Bar Association and Chicago Bar Association also
gave strong endorsements, with the latter stating he was “a scholarly, thoughtful, hardworking justice
[who] demands excellence from both himself and those who practice before him.” Id.
276. Id.
277. Stamos Interview, supra note 121.
278. Stamos Interview, supra note 121.
279. Author’s personal examination of Westlaw database in which he was listed as counsel for the
Cook County State’s Attorney (county-based criminal and civil division), including his time as chief of
the criminal division (1961–65), when he was first deputy (1965) and then appointed the Cook County
State’s Attorney (1966–68). (June 30, 2012, Westlaw search). During his time as Cook County State’s
Attorney, Richard Speck murdered eight nursing students in a Chicago boarding house. Although his
political career could have rocketed to the top by prosecuting that case, he gave it to one of his staff.
See William J. Martin, Attorney Recalls Speck Murders 45 Years Later, CHI. DAILY L. BULLETIN,
July 14, 2011. When Mayor Richard J. Daley picked someone else to slate for election to statewide
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Court, First District, Third Division¾the same appellate court that
decided Quake. During that tenure, Stamos’ name is referenced in over
eight hundred opinions, and he delivered the court’s opinion in over sixty
cases.280 Justice Stamos served only nineteen months on the Illinois
Supreme Court bench. Even in that short time, he left a lasting legacy,
delivering the court’s opinion in sixty-three cases, most of which remain
good law.281 Five opinions involved lawyer discipline and also reflect a
crisp mastery of the law as well as a willingness to extend the law¾most
notable was the lawyer discipline case, In Re Himmel.282
September 20, 1989, Stamos announced he would not run for
reelection and upon his December retirement would associate with his
son’s law firm.283 The announcement avoided a political dilemma for
Democratic leaders who had pledged to slate a black candidate for that
position.284 He retired December 3, 1990, and was replaced that day by
Intermediate Appellate Court Justice Charles Freeman, who previously
voted with Justice White to reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Quake’s
complaint.285 Justice Stamos’ special concurrence in Quake was his last
opinion, issued the same day.286
Separate consideration of Justice Calvo’s majority opinion for the
court and Justice Stamos’ special concurrence is necessary to highlight
the doctrinal impact of the case, both on letters of intent and promissory
estoppel. The Calvo opinion leaves room for far-reaching interpretation,
whereas Stamos’ concurrence narrowly limits precontractual liability for
promissory estoppel.

office of State’s Attorney, Stamos then ran for and was elected in 1968 to the Illinois Appellate Court,
First District based in Chicago. Tybor, supra note 274; John J. Stamos: Previous Illinois Supreme
Court
Justice,
ILL.
COURTS,
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/JusticeArchive/
Bio_Stamos.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
280. Author’s Westlaw search dated June 30, 2012.
281. Id.
282. In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Ill. 1988) (one year suspension); In re Lunardi, 537
N.E.2d 767, 775 (Ill. 1989) (eighteen month suspension for conviction of cocaine suspension and
improper loans to judge; mitigating circumstances lessened discipline imposed); In re Alexander, 539
N.E.2d 1260, 1266–67 (Ill. 1989) (denying reinstatement for lawyer disbarred for bribing public
officials and failing to make restitution; factually involve one of early Greylord defendants); In re
Imming, 545 N.E.2d 715, 725 (Ill. 1989) (rejecting disbarment recommendation; two year suspension
for client-lawyer conflict in business transaction and undue influence over client).
283. Charles N. Wheeler III, Stamos Won’t Seek New Term on High Court, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept.
21, 1989, at 14.
284. Id.
285. Stamos Interview, supra note 121.
286. Stamos was formerly associated with his son’s firm, Stamos & Trucco LLP. STAMOS & TRUCCO
LLP, http://www.stamostrucco.com/bio.php (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). At times he was retained as
a Special Consultant to the IARDC Administrator. E-mail from Jim Grogan, Deputy Administrator
and Chief Counsel of the IARDC (July 19, 2012 12:41 CST) (on file with Author). He recently died at
age 92. See Mark Mathewson, Former Illinois Supreme Court Justice John Stamos Dies at 92, ILL.
STATE BAR ASS’N (Jan. 30, 2017).
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A. MAJORITY OPINION UNDER THE NAME OF JUSTICE CALVO
Justice Calvo’s opinion was painful to read. It was like that of a
struggling first year or second year law student: badly overwritten,
redundant, and sophomoric. It rehashes, ad nauseum, the arguments
made by each side on appeal and repeatedly states its agreement with the
decision below.
The textbook authors who edited this opinion must have strained to
pick what selections to include. It is unfortunate, but understandable,
that they could not instead excerpt Justice White’s lower court opinion,
the few of Calvo’s paragraphs on promissory estoppel, and Justice
Stamos’ superb special concurrence. Those texts include extended
passages that demonstrate ambiguity both from Plaintiff’s and
Defendant’s perspectives. For example, the fact that “notice of award
authorizes the work” and that work was to commence “4 to 11 days [later]
. . . reveal[ed] the parties’ [binding] intent . . . so the work could begin on
schedule. . . . The cancellation clause also implied . . . [intent] . . . at least
until they entered into the formal contract.”287 Lengthy recital of
Defendants’ argument on incompleteness related to the kind of terms
such as those pertaining to MBE and other open terms left to be
negotiated.288
The defense arguments bear great force under traditional contract
doctrine.289 Common law courts are hesitant to plug holes in agreements
that parties carelessly left open, whether in an action for damages, as
here, or for specific performance.290 Calvo’s opinion ignored such policy
concerns, stating “[t]he letter merely indicated that those goals would be
reiterated in the contract. We acknowledge that the absence of certain
terms . . . indicates the parties’ [lack of] intent . . . [which] only confirms
our holding that the letter is ambiguous” on the issue, dismissing the
policy concerns.291 “The particular facts in each case are significant. The
only way to allay Defendants’ fears is to change the law; we are unwilling

287. Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990, 996–97 (Ill. 1990).
288. Id. at 997.
289. FARNSWORTH, supra note 9, at § 3.8 (future writing contemplated); Id. §§ 3.27–3.30
(definiteness requirement and mitigating doctrines); Id. § 12.7 (limitations on specific relief); Id.
§ 12.15 (uncertainty limitation). In first discussing the case with Peter Petrakis, lead defense counsel,
he said the case turned traditional law on letters of intent “on their head.” Petrakis Interview, supra
note 198.
290. See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. 1965) (incomplete loan agreement fatally
defective in damages action, but allowed defensive use of promissory estoppel for reliance damages;
reversing dismissal on pleadings). If the case arose instead under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the many “gap-fillers” authorize courts to fill in the blanks if there is sufficient evidence of
binding intent (easily shown) and a basis for fashioning a remedy. See generally U.C.C. 2 §§ 2-204(3),
1-203–2-205, 2-301, 2-305–2-309, 2-313–2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).
291. Quake Constr., Inc., 565 N.E.2d at 997.
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to do this.”292 By contrast, the opinion below by Justice White and Justice
Stamos’ special concurrence considered the need for closer examination
of context.
The fact that prompt beginning was mutually understood further
supported finding that the parties had moved beyond preliminary
negotiations, muddling analysis of the customary factors courts weighed
in deciding intent when a contemplated writing does not come into
existence.293 The majority opinion conceded the plausibility of getting a
contract finalized and signed quickly, finding that lent “credence to [the
court’s] conclusion the letter is ambiguous concerning the parties’ intent
[requiring] . . . the trier of fact [to] . . . decide which interpretation is
valid.”294
While the cancellation clause could possibly be construed to make a
formal, executed contract a true condition precedent to formation of a
contract, the statement that Jones could “cancel” the letter created an
internal ambiguity. If the letter of intent created no binding obligation,
then there would be no need for the clause.295 This analysis paralleled
Justice White’s opinion below. After more unnecessary verbiage, Justice
Calvo’s majority opinion stated the holding on the main contract issue:
Thus, we hold that the letter of intent in the case at bar is ambiguous
regarding the parties’ intent to be bound by it. Therefore, on remand,
the circuit court should allow the parties to present parol evidence
regarding their intent. The trier of fact must then determine, based on
the parties’ intent, whether the letter of intent is a binding contract.296

Because the court below did not address the condition precedent
issue, that too would be remanded to the circuit court.297 While the
majority opinion purportedly limited its holding to the facts of the case,
the extensive dicta could be viewed as a judicial treatise on the state of
Illinois law on precontractual liability, albeit one that caused
unnecessary confusion.298
Nineteen pages into the opinion appeared four paragraphs
addressing promissory estoppel. With scant independent analysis, the
court affirmed the lower court finding that “determination of the parties’

292. Id. at 998. Policy concern addressed again later. “Defendants [contend that affirmance
would] . . . put[] the continued viability of letters of intent at risk . . . . [I]f we uphold . . . finding the
cancellation clause ambiguous, negotiating parties will have difficulty finding limiting language which
a court would unquestionably consider unambiguous. We disagree. Courts have found letters of intent
unambiguous in several cases referred to in this opinion.” Id. at 1001.
293. Id. at 998.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1000.
296. Id. at 1004.
297. Id.
298. See Mark K. Johnson, Note, Enforceability of Precontractual Agreements in Illinois: The
Need For a Middle Ground, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 939, 958–59 (1993).
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intent will affect the question of whether plaintiff met the elements of
promissory estoppel, namely, whether plaintiff could have reasonably
relied on the promise and whether Defendants could have foreseen that
plaintiff would so rely.”299 Plaintiff’s allegations “sufficiently alleged
[a cause of action meeting] the elements of promissory estoppel.”300
B.

SPECIAL CONCURRENCE BY JUSTICE STAMOS

Justice Stamos was a highly respected member of the court known
for prior selfless acts.301 His special concurrence agreed with the
majority’s disposition but would limit recovery to the specific facts of the
case. The letter was just ambiguous enough to withstand dismissal; the
majority opinion would support dangerous expansion of recovery on
letters of intent. “[T]he misuse of letters of intent by parties seemingly
wishing to have their contractual cake and eat it too, or wishing merely
to fudge the contract issue, ought to evoke judicial disapproval.”302 The
majority’s apparent view seems “to turn it on its head and to pervert any
legitimate office of letters of intent.”303 Its effect thus “transmut[ed] this
prospective bargain into current obligation, by confusing a hoped-for
construction contract with a cancellable preliminary expression of
intent.”304
The concurrence has a literary quality in its well-crafted legal
analysis, quoting Shakespeare, Williston, Corbin, Knapp, and
Farnsworth. It carefully parsed the letter’s words to conclude that Quake
might have a right to recover. More important, Stamos admonished
practicing lawyers to take greater care while drafting such letters.305
At issue was whether the letter’s term “elected” was ambiguous,
leaving room for extrinsic evidence and presenting a fact question to be
determined by the trier of fact. Here, “the written recital that Jones had
‘elected’ to award” the contract is so ambiguous that it only “hint[ed]” at
whether or not the parties intended to be bound.306 Neither did the fact
that the writing contemplated work to begin immediately support a
finding of contract intent; a completed contract could be accomplished
quickly.307 Stamos was especially troubled by the majority’s

299. Quake Constr., Inc., 565 N.E.2d at 1005.
300. Id.
301. See Martin, supra note 279. One example was Stamos’ refusal to prosecute a high profile
murder case against Richard Speck. Id.
302. Quake Constr., Inc., 565 N.E.2d at 1006 (Stamos, J., concurring).
303. Id. at 1007.
304. Id. (“’Much as word is a shadow of deed or which may be father to thought’ . . . a letter of
intent may lead to a contract, but it is not necessarily the contract itself.” (quoting WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 5)).
305. Quake Constr., Inc., 565 N.E.2d at 1010.
306. Id. at 1006.
307. Id.
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interpretation of the cancellation clause, which referred to cancelling the
letter and not the anticipated contract.308 Such language “powerfully
militates” against finding a contract, which treats a future executed
subcontract as a “future possibility rather than present reality.”309
Stamos considered a tenuous alternative theory that a contract
existed based on Quake’s promise to perform in return for Jones’
conditional promise to pay if the parties reached agreement on a “fully
executed” document and on other open terms.310 The parties’ post-letter
conduct would be relevant to whether they had reached a conditional
construction contract, allowing Quake possible relief under either
restitution or quantum meruit, but not expectation or reliance
damages.311
Stamos preferred to treat the letter as an agreement to negotiate,
with mutual consideration given to Quake by Jones’ implied promise of
efforts to negotiate; by authorizing Quake to use the letter to obtain
subcontractors’ license numbers; and Quake’s own promise to negotiate
and promised efforts to contract with subcontractors.312 Stamos rejected
a possible attack on lack of mutuality of obligation because only Jones
had the right to cancel.313 Citing comment e to section 26 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the letter arguably gave Quake
reason to know that Jones intended no contract until other terms were
assented to.314 Jones was merely American’s agent to review and award
contracts, with Quake engaging in preparations to perform but never
proceeding with actual work under the contemplated contract.315
In customary business matters, “letters of intent are usually
understood to be non-committal statements preliminary to a contract”
warranting fact-intensive inquiries to find otherwise.316 Because letters
of intent present risks of unintended consequences they can be seen as
“an invention of the devil.”317 Stamos cautioned the need for drafters to
avoid any ambiguity with respect to intent to be bound. Bargaining
expediency may create ambiguities with short term benefits, but such
308. Id. at 1007.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1008.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1006–07 (citing FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, at 250–69 (addressing letters of intent as
“agreements with open terms” and “agreements to negotiate”)); Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to
Bargain, supra note 6, at 711 (regarding need to recognize “good-faith bargaining duty as intermediate
stage between ultimate contract and none.”).
313. Quake Constr., Inc., 565 N.E.2d at 1007 (Stamos, J., concurring).
314. Id. at 1009.
315. Id.
316. Id. (citing JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2-6(c) (3d ed.
1987); FARNSWORTH, supra note 21).
317. Quake Constr., Inc., 565 N.E.2d at 1009–10 (citing Andrew R. Klein, Comment, Devil’s
Advocate: Salvaging the Letter of Intent, 37 EMORY L.J. 139, 139 n.1 (1988)).
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“obscurantist language . . . can well lead eventually to litigation and
undesired contractual obligations.”318 Litigation risks exist despite the
utmost care in drafting, yet greater clarity than that displayed here
should reduce that risk.319
C.

EPILOGUE

After the court’s December 3, 1990, decision, the case limped along
until the parties stipulated to dismissal on August 19, 1994. Heytow
refiled the Third Amended Complaint a year after the decision. It appears
Petrakis and Stuetzer grew weary or that American balked at the
litigation costs because thereafter, all work was done by Cynthia
Photos-Abbott, who was junior to them at the firm.320 Abbott
demonstrated litigation smartness, with the best defense being a good
offense. She tackled Quake head-on with a bare-boned answer filed in
February 1992, admitting only that American made an oral award
expressly conditioned on Quake obtaining MBE subcontractor
participation consistent with specified goals, which it failed to do.321
American still insisted there was no binding agreement absent a
formalized writing and that the letter of intent was subject to cancellation
if Quake did not meet the required MBE participation. Further, it
maintained that Quake’s involvement in the project was properly
terminated because of such failure.322 American raised two affirmative
defenses. First, American never intended the letter of intent to be a
binding contract¾having specifically reserved the right to cancel if the
parties could not agree on a fully executed subcontract and other
requirements, including MBE participation, were not met.323 Second,
Quake’s involvement was properly terminated because it failed to obtain
MBE participation consistent with the stated goals.324 This is the first
time in seven years of litigation that Quake’s failure to meet the MBE
goals was expressly made part of the litigation record.
On April 1, 1992, Heytow filed a general denial to the Affirmative
Defenses. For the next year, the parties skirmished in discovery, with

318. Quake Constr., Inc., 565 N.E.2d at 1010 (citing to Pennzoil liability as an extreme example of
undesired contractual obligation).
319. Id.
320. Abbott received her J.D. from Northwestern in 1986 and worked at the Katten Muchin
Rosenman firm after graduation until 1997, when she moved to Motorola, Inc. as Senior Litigation
Counsel. Cynthia (Cindy) Abbott, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/cindyabbott (last visited
Nov. 21, 2017).
321. Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Third Amended Complaint, supra note 33, at Count 1,
¶¶ 6, 18, Count II, ¶¶ 10, 11.
322. Id. Count III, ¶ 12.
323. American Airlines, Inc.’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Third Amended Complaint,
Quak Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 565 N.E. 2d 990 (Ill. 1990) (Feb. 19, 1992) (on file with Author).
324. Id. Affirmative Defenses.
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limited information provided by either side. American identified Charles
Dierker in Illinois and Ken Bower in Dallas-Fort Worth as having
participated in the decisions both to award, and to terminate, Quake’s
involvement.325 Although individuals on both sides were served
deposition notices, it appears none took place, as the lawyers pursued
settlement discussions.326
The defense took a sharp offensive turn, with hand-delivered service
of a Motion for Leave to File Counterclaim on April 12, 1994, and hearing
scheduled at 11:15 that morning.327 Where American’s Answer raised the
affirmative defense that Quake was not a bona fide MBE, the
Counterclaim added to the facts and suggest a nuanced rest of the story.
The subcontractors who attended the preconstruction meeting “were
completely different” from those Quake listed on its bid proposal and
Quake failed to provide affirmative action certificates from the MBE
firms it listed. After terminating Quake’s involvement, American
awarded the project to Powers & Sons¾the next lowest responsive
bidder¾for $90,000 more than Quake’s price.328 My research indicated
Powers & Sons had rich construction experience as an established
minority-owned business and thus presented none of the risk of an entity
like Quake¾a new entrant with no established track record. Given
American’s original Answer¾that it had no other bid documents¾and
that Powers & Sons had been considered for the $2.5 million role of
Minority Consultant, I speculate that the void left by Quake caused
American to later recruit Powers’ involvement in the smaller project.329
American’s Counterclaim puts the case in an entirely new
perspective. Assuming that American could have supported its
Counterclaim with facts at trial, why did it wait so long to articulate its
suspicions, until after losing before the Illinois Supreme Court? The

325. American Airlines, Inc.’s Response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories, Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E. 2d 990 (Ill. 1990) (May 12, 1993). Neither Dierker nor Lustig were then
employed by American. The Author made repeated efforts to interview Bowers, all to no avail. The
case was transferred to a new judge who set it for a “progress call”; although the docket reflects notice
was mailed, Heytow denies having received it; Judge Hogan dismissed the case June 5, 1992. He filed
a Motion to Vacate and Affidavit claiming he first learned of the dismissal December 27, 1993, upon
receipt of a letter refusing to produce Bowers, Dierker and Lustig. (Jan. 5, 1994), Plaintiff’s Notice of
Deposition (Dec. 14, 1993) (on file with Author). Judge Hogan granted plaintiff’s motion to vacate
(Feb. 7, 1994).
326. Heytow Interview, supra note 109, at 2.
327. Motion for Leave to File Counterclaim, Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E. 2d
990 (Ill. 1990) (Apr. 12, 1994) (on file with Author).
328. Powers & Sons Construction Company website is a well-established MBE “committed to
excellence since 1967.” POWERS & SONS CONSTR. CO., http://powersandsons.com/ (last visited Nov. 21,
2017) (listing its advantages of their “commitment to the MBE/WBE community” on homepage).
Repeated efforts to communicate with responsible officials at Powers & Sons familiar with these
matters were to no avail.
329. See Motion for Leave to File Counterclaim, supra note 327.
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answer is probably a combination of politics, and when litigation arose,
standard litigation defense strategy seeking dismissal to avoid the
merits.330 Given the extreme pressure to hire more MBEs for the
construction project, it would have looked foolish to award Quake the
contract and then promptly discharge, stating its suspicion that Quake
was a front. Indeed, proper focus would be on American’s behavior
before awarding the project to anyone. Had American followed its stated
protocol, any bidder must first have incorporated and prequalified with
the Small Business Administration. Had Powers & Sons actually
submitted a bid for the project, they should have been given the job.331
Had American done its homework and not rushed to award the contract
and start the job it could have avoided this costly mess.
In support of the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision remanding the
case for fact finding on the parties’ intent, Quake imposes potential
liability on American for its sloppiness in the bargaining process and
perhaps deliberate ambiguity in the letter of intent. Because the case
settled, Quake was never put to the test to prove its legitimacy as an MBE.
Multiple interviews indicate that the stated protocols were often
circumvented, especially in public construction projects.332 When
Quamina appeared as the only person of color at the preconstruction
meeting, why did American fail to first raise its suspicions and give Quake
an opportunity to establish its bona fides? As a new entrant to the
construction field, he may have embarked on the venture with the best
intentions; if given an opportunity to explain or find other MBE
subcontractors, he might have been able to make things right. Without
imputing any bad faith to American’s actors, they were sloppy and
engaged in cheap talk.
The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision is supportable by all scholars
who subscribe to some type of limited role for precontractual liability. As

330. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010) (discussing restrictive procedural stop signs that are
expensive, time consuming and prevent plaintiffs’ claims from reaching trial); Baird E-mail June 29,
2016, supra note 65.
331. A curious possibility presents itself in American’s Response to Plaintiff’s Request to Produce,
Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E. 2d 990 (Ill. 1990) (June 21, 1993) (on file with
Author). Request No. 1 seeks “All bids with all attached or supporting documents received by you
concerning the project referred to in Plaintiff’s Complaint.” Response, following irrelevancy objection:
“American states that it has no bids other than the bid attached as Exhibit 2 to plaintiff’s complaint.”
Id. Could it be that Quake was the sole bidder on this project? But see supra notes 88–94 and
accompanying text (discussing Powers’ potential involvement as $2.5 million MBE Consultant on the
project). It is doubtful they would have also bid on the smaller project, but worth noting here; perhaps
American had to bring in Powers when Quake proved unsuitable. If this imagined scenario were
accurate, it would further prove the sloppiness caused by American rushing to quell the political
pressures.
332. See Coleman Interview, supra note 102 (Jones waived its stated deadline by awarding project
to Quake whose bid was date-stamped three days later.).
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in Hoffman, when a planned deal goes south and the less sophisticated
actor incurs costs in genuine reliance on what were thought to be
unambiguous promises, liability properly attaches. Under Professor
Knapp’s “contract to bargain” approach, once the parties’ negotiations
culminated in the letter of intent and American induced Quake to incur
costs preparing to perform, good business ethics support potential
liability for failure to negotiate in good faith to complete the
agreement.333 If, indeed, American began to doubt Quake’s bona fides as
an MBE, it had a good faith duty to raise the issue, giving Quake an
opportunity to explain or address the concerns, and not unilaterally
cancel on the pretext that the common law conferred the absolute right
to walk away.
Professor Robert Scott takes a law and economics approach to
analyze a case from the top down, seeking a rule that’s supported by
rational incentives.334 Large transactional and corporate actors who
regularly engage in high dollar negotiations should be incentivized to act
with care, avoiding sloppy language in their letters of intent. If they really
want the right to cancel without liability, they need to take the time to
make sure this is the correct bidder to get the contract. If one takes the
contextual approach of relational contracts, epitomized by Professor
Stewart Macaulay and Professor William Whitford, one should protect
the naïve new entrant who may not be attuned to the wiles of high dollar
negotiation and the customary view of precontractual costs as
investments in getting the deal done.335 Particularly here, where the
whole setting was infused with racial politics and Operation PUSH’s
pressure on American and unexplained decision to fast-track the project,
Quake’s alleged costs in preparing to perform should be reimbursed even
though American arguably never made a true offer that Quake could
accept.
CONCLUSION
Although the Quake case was rightly decided on the main contract
issue regarding the letter of intent, the majority opinion allowing remand
on promissory estoppel is troubling, both on the barren factual record
and on broader policy grounds. Several Illinois cases after Quake have
held that, despite the permissibility of alternative pleading, the contract
and estoppel claims were mutually exclusive, at least when the matter

333. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, supra note 5.
334. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Limits of the Legal Method, supra note 30.
335. Whitford & Macaulay, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores: The Rest of the Story, supra note 14, at
801, 836, 846 (justifying Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in finding franchisor’s authorized agent
told prospective franchisee that he would get a store by investing $18,000 and suggesting that deal
ultimately failed was because of policy change in the corporate franchise department).
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was presented for summary judgment.336 Allowance of the narrower
contract claim made unnecessary the murkier promissory estoppel
claim.337 Maybe those four paragraphs in Justice Calvo’s opinion can be
dismissed as overbroad dicta because justice could be reached under the
contract to bargain. Lacking information on the Quake court’s inner
workings, we can only wish that the deliberative appellate process
produced a narrower majority opinion that did not open the floodgates
to unwieldy claims and ongoing confusion about Illinois law on
promissory estoppel.
Justice Stamos was right¾precautionary lawyer involvement would
lower the risk of a successful challenge to prospective bargains. In Quake,
it appears that Jones, acting for American, used standard form
agreements without individualized input from legal counsel, both before
awarding the contract to Quake and before terminating it. This raises a
crucial professional responsibility point: Lawyers must train their clients
on important times for communication, exercising due care before
entering relationships that may have binding consequences, and before
taking peremptory actions that could cause protracted litigation.338 A key
takeaway of Stamos’ opinion is that this long, expensive litigation could
have been avoided if only there was effective communication between
Jones or American and their respective legal counsel. Under the political
circumstances at the time, it appears American hurriedly jumped into the
deal without due regard for the potential legal consequences. Who knows
what would have happened had Jones and the American representatives
consulted with corporate counsel before awarding the contract. It is likely
that American’s corporate public relations staff were more concerned
about immediate political controversies and did not anticipate the legal
risks if the MBE award to Quake proved unwise. Client representatives
may avoid consulting with counsel before entering a deal because they
consider it unnecessary or because they view lawyers as over-cautious
deal-breakers. Such hasty precontractual “cheap talk” risks that
“disappointed potential traders” such as Quake can recover under
promissory estoppel, despite the lack of clear contractual intent.339
Having embarked on an unduly casual contractual relationship, its hasty
break-up was legally messy and expensive.

336. See generally notes 23–25.
337. See generally cases cited supra note 24.
338. See generally Barbara Wagner, Defining Key Competencies for Business Lawyers, 72 BUS. L.
101 (2017) (discussing findings from a report prepared in response to concerns from the American Bar
Association).
339. Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law
of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 484 n.183, 496–97 n.209 (1999); see also Knapp,
Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, supra note 5.
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Once litigation began, lawyers had to enter the picture. Jones
retained outside counsel for the defense, although presumably
American’s in-house counsel monitored the case. Initially I was
bewildered at the defense strategy to seek dismissal on the pleadings,
thus avoiding an answer on the merits, revealing their perception that
Quake, which claimed MBE status, was a front for a non-minority
company. In context, however, this strategy was sensible, reflecting
routine defense strategies to avoid the merits by challenging sufficiency
of the pleadings, and to avoid inflaming Chicago’s volatile politics on its
public construction works.
For future private and public actors seeking to use voluntary racial
preferences, the ongoing Supreme Court litigation about reverse
discrimination will further silence frank disclosure in acknowledging
diversity-based motives for business decisions and will heighten the risk
of precontractual liability for alleged reliance. What does this mean for
contracting entities seeking to share resources fairly within the taxpayer
base without risking unwanted juridical liability for promissory estoppel?
The answer lies in good lawyering and well-trained clients: enter these
deals with care and avoid bargaining sloppiness with clear drafting. If a
relationship sours, proceed to terminate it with the wise guidance of
counsel, documenting the underlying reasons, and ensuring that the
termination communications pass legal muster.
What is Quake’s significance for contract doctrine under promissory
estoppel for precontractual liability? After unsuccessfully challenging the
sufficiency of the pleadings, American settled the case for an undisclosed
amount, the likely outcome for similar pleading challenges. In Hoffman
and other promissory estoppel cases allowing recovery reliance, plaintiffs
either proved or alleged genuine damages suffered in reasonable,
substantial reliance on the faulty promises. At best, Quake’s pleadings
alleged the thinnest of reliance for eight days, setting a high water mark
for such recovery. Commercial actors should view Quake with caution,
presenting a clear legal risk of liability for bargaining sloppiness in using
letters of intent without carefully and explicitly defining what needs to be
finalized before concluding the deal. This is especially so when the other
party is somewhat unsophisticated and may be lulled into starting to
perform or preparing to perform before the formalized contract is
complete.
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APPENDIX A: JONES BROTHERS LETTER OF INTENT
TO QUAKE CONSTRUCTION INC.340

340. Letter of Intent from Jones Brothers to Quake Construction Inc. (Apr. 18, 1985) (on file with
Author). This Letter of Intent was attached to all versions of Quake’s Complaint.
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APPENDIX A: JONES BROTHERS LETTER OF INTENT
TO QUAKE CONSTRUCTION INC.341

341. Letter of Intent from Jones Brothers to Quake Construction Inc. (Apr. 18, 1985) (on file with
Author). This Letter of Intent was attached to all versions of Quake’s Complaint.
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APPENDIX B: TIMELINE OF THE
QUAKE CONSTRUCTION V. AMERICAN AIRLINES LITIGATION
Timeline
March 19, 1985
Invitation for
bids

April 3, 1985
Washington
Exec. Order 85-2
(30% public
contracts to
MBEs)

April 9, 1985
Quake bid

April 13, 1985
Jones date
stamped

April 1985
Oral notice of
award

April 18, 1985
Jones sent letter
of intent to
Quake

April 22, 1985
Construction
begins

April 25, 1985
Pre-construction
meeting and
letter of
termination

June 26, 1985
Quake, Inc.
incorporated

December 1,
1987
3rd amended
complaint
dismissed with
prejudice; ruled
for defendants

December 23,
1987
Appeal to 1st
Judicial Dist.
App. Ill

January 11, 1989
Oral argument
scheduled
“waived”

March 29, 1989
2-1 reversed and
remanded

May 3, 1989
Defendants
petitioned for
leave to appeal

December 3,
1990
Il. S. Ct.
affirmed App.
Ct. reversing
trial court
dismissal and
remanded for
further
proceedings

February 19,
1992
Defendant
American
answer and
affirmative
defenses

April 1, 1992
Plaintiff general
denial to
American’s
affirmative
defenses;
discovery

April 12, 1992
American filed
motion to file
counter claim

August 19, 1994
Stipulated
dismissal

January 22,
1986
Suit Filed

